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ARTICLE 2 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE AND CONSUMER




Controversy has surrounded many of the principles and
doctrines of the Uniform Commercial Code1 (the "Code") for more
than four decades. 2 One criticism, which emerged in the 1960s,
was that the Code was indifferent to economic hardships
suffered by consumers 3 in the marketplace. 4 This indifference
t Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. J.D., 1970,
University of Toledo.
I The Code has been enacted in all fifty states as well as Puerto Rico, the
District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Louisiana and Puerto Rico have
enacted only parts of the Code. The Code was a joint project of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") and the
American Law Institute ("ALI"). Work began in 1942 and continued for more than a
decade.
The focus of this article is Article 2 (Sales). Proposed amendments to Article 2
were approved by the NCCUSL in 2002 and by the ALI in 2003. The text of these
proposed amendments and the preliminary official comments are available at
http://www.nccusl.org. Unless otherwise indicated, citations are to existing Article 2,
and to Revised Article 1, approved by the sponsoring organizations in 2001.
2 Examples include section 2-207, U.C.C. § 2-207 (2003), on the battle of forms
and section 2-302, id. § 2-302, which recognizes the doctrine of unconscionability.
See generally Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of Forms in Action, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 2678 (2000) (discussing the difficulties courts have encountered in applying
section 2-207); Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionable Quandary: UCC Article 2 and the
Unconscionability Doctrine, 31 N.M. L. REV. 359, 386-87 (2001) (summarizing the
controversy that surrounds the doctrine of unconscionability).
3 Proposed U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(c) defines "consumer" as "an individual who
buys ... goods that at the time of contracting are intended by the individual to be
used for personal, family, or household purposes." U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(c) (Draft for
Approval 2001) [hereinafter proposed U.C.C.] ("consumer" is currently defined in
U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(1)).
4 During the 1960s, Article 3's holder-in-due-course doctrine that protected
transferees of promissory notes from consumer claims and defenses generated
extensive criticism. See, e.g., Albert J. Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71
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triggered demands for consumer protection laws and, in the
1970s, Congress and state legislatures enacted reform measures
designed to curb abuses in transactions that fall within the scope
of the Code. 5
Although protection laws multiplied in number, some
scholars claimed that fundamental fairness in contract6
relationships between consumers and merchants 7 had not been
COLUM. L. REV. 375, 375-77 (1971). Courts, legislatures, and, finally, the Federal
Trade Commission took action to prevent use of the doctrine in consumer
installment goods and service transactions. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS, § 11.8 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the doctrine and efforts to protect
consumers); see also U.C.C. § 3-302(g) (providing that Article 3 is subordinate to any
law which limits "status as a holder in due course in particular classes of
transactions").
5 See STATE UCC VARIATIONS (P & F eds., West 1998) (1965). A small number
of states, including Maine, see id. § 2-316, Connecticut, see id. § 42a-2-316, and
Maryland, see id. § 2-316.1, ban clauses that disclaim implied warranties or limit
remedies for breach of these warranties in consumer contracts for the sale of goods.
All states and the District of Columbia have enacted "lemon laws" to supplement
Article 2 in response to consumer complaints that automobile dealers did not repair
defects in new cars. See Joan Vogel, Squeezing Consumers: Lemon Laws, Consumer
Warranties, and a Proposal For Reform, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 589, 615-44 (1985)
(criticizing these laws).
In 1975, Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act to eliminate confusion over what warranties
manufacturers and sellers give on their products. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312
(2000); see also Kathleen F. Brickey, The Magnuson-Moss Act-An Analysis of the
Efficacy of Federal Warranty Regulation as a Consumer Protection Tool, 18 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 73, 73-77 (1978) (discussing the consumer complaints that prompted
Congress to take action). See generally JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER,
CONSUMER WARRANTY LAW (2d ed. 2001) (evaluating all state and federal consumer
warranty legislation); Donald F. Clifford, Jr., Non-UCC Statutory Provisions
Affecting Warranty Disclaimers and Remedies in Sales of Goods, 71 N.C. L. REV.
1011 (1993) (same).
6 Proposed U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(d) defines "consumer contract" as "a contract
between a merchant seller and a consumer." Proposed U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(d).
Currently, "consumer contract" is not defined by the U.C.C., whereas "contract" is
defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(12).
7 U.C.C, § 2-104(1) provides:
'Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise. . . holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge
or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other
intermediary who holds himself out [by occupation] as having such
knowledge or skill.
U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
Although this article is limited to a discussion of consumer issues, small
businesses have also claimed that they lack equal bargaining power, knowledge,
and sophistication in transactions with powerful merchants and are in need of
protection. See, e.g., Richard J. Hunter Jr., Unconscionability Revisited: A
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achieved.8 Existing consumer laws were limited in coverage, 9
and injustices not captured by these laws continued to flourish in
the marketplace.' 0 During the 1980s, commentators warned
that the economic welfare of consumers would continue to
deteriorate unless more innovative solutions to consumer
grievances were developed and implemented in every state.1' At
Comparative Approach, 68 N.D. L. REV. 145, 150 (1992); Jane P. Mallor,
Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 Sw. L.J. 1065, 1074-84
(1986); Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and
Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459, 481-82 (1995); G. Richard Shell, Substituting
Ethical Standards for Common Law Rules in Commercial Cases: An Emerging
Statutory Trend, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1198, 1199 (1988); William J. Woodward, "Sale"
of Law and Forum and the Widening Gulf Between "Consumer" and "Nonconsumer"
Contracts in the UCC, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 244-46 (1997).
8 See generally Lary Lawrence, Toward A More Efficient and Just Economy: An
Argument for Limited Enforcement of Consumer Promises, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 815
(1987).
9 State lemon laws apply, with only limited exceptions, to new motor vehicles.
See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 5, § 13.2.3.
10 See Task Force of the A.B.A. Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales,
Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, Committee on the Uniform Commercial
Code, An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990 Preliminary Report of the Uniform
Commercial Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981, 1003 (1991)
[hereinafter Task Force of the A.B.A.] ("There is not available a viable package of
non-U.C.C. law to resolve consumer sales law problems.").
11 Commentators have focused on the use of standard form contracts in
consumer transactions. Some have claimed that certain clauses contained in these
contracts favor the drafter. See, e.g., Michael M. Greenfield & Linda J. Rusch,
Limits on Standard-Form Contracting in Revised Article 2, 32 UCC L.J. 115, 118-19
(1999) (listing typical standard form provisions that may be unfair to consumers);
Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 495 (2002) (observing that "the electronic
environment gives businesses new opportunities to exploit consumers"); Arthur
Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the Common Law
Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 356-57 (1970) (arguing for limits on or
preclusion of certain standard contract clauses); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV 1174, 1275 (1983)
(explaining the means by which drafters of standard contracts seek to avoid legal
obligations); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control
of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 531 (1971) ("Forms standardized to
achieve economies of mass production and mass merchandising will also, under the
present system, almost certainly be unfair, because if they were not, their issuers
would probably lose money."). Other writers have insisted that standard forms are
beneficial. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Commercial Norms and the Fine Art of the
Small Con: Comments on Daniel Keating's 'Exploring the Battle of Forms in Action,
98 MICH. L. REV. 2716, 2724 (2000) (arguing consumers may benefit from a market
devoid of bargaining); John J. A. Burke, Contract As Commodity: A Nonfiction
Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 290-91 (2000) ("These contracts are
neither good nor bad, and neither just nor unjust, for they are necessary
and ... beneficial.").
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the same time, the American Law Institute (ALI) and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) recommended that existing articles of the Code be
revised and new articles be created. 12 This recommendation was
prompted by two concerns. 13 First, some Code sections were
ambiguous and conflicting judicial interpretations had emerged.
These interpretations undermined the Code's objective to provide
uniform principles and standards to govern commercial
transactions in this country. 14 Second, state legislatures enacted
the Code before the consumer movement was organized and
before technology and new methods of doing business dominated
the marketplace. 15  The Code was in danger of becoming
hopelessly outdated unless principles were established to
accommodate these developments.
Consumer advocates greeted the recommendation with
enthusiasm. 16 The Code had not been completely updated since
12 The process began in 1987 with the approval of a new article, Article 2A
(Leases). New Article 4A (Funds Transfers) was completed in 1989. Since that time
revisions or amendments have been made to every article in the Code. See Fred H.
Miller, Modernizing the UCC for the New Millennium: Introduction to a Collection
on the New UCC, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 189, 195-202 (2000) (outlining these
efforts). Information on adoption of revised or amended articles is available at
http://www.nccusl.org.
13 See Gerald T. McLaughlin, The Evolving Uniform Commercial Code: From
Infancy to Maturity to Old Age, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 691, 693 (1993) (explaining
varying state interpretations of ambiguous terms); Fred H. Miller, Is Karl's Code
Kaput?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 703, 706-07 (1993) (listing the reasons why Code
articles were in need of revision).
14 U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(3) provides that one of the purposes of the Code is "to make
uniform the law among the various jurisdictions." U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(3).
Professor Miller stated: "The Uniform Commercial Code is simply too important
to the economy of the country and to the perpetuation of the federal system to
permit significant nonuniformity through amendments, or through the failure to
enact the revisions." Fred H. Miller, Consumers and the Code: The Search for the
Proper Formula, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 187, 214 (1997).
15 In 1993, Professor Miller identified technological developments to include
electronic funds transfers, electronic data interchange, and automated check
processing. New methods of doing business included leasing of goods and the
issuance of variable rate notes. Miller, supra note 13, at 707. Software contracts and
licenses of information were in their infancy and scholars had only begun to
examine the desirability of including these transactions within the scope of Article
2. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes, and
Reinvigorating Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1337, 1342-43 (1994).
16 See Fred H. Miller, Realism Not Idealism in Uniform Laws-Observations
From the Revision of the UCC, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 707, 727 (1998) (stating that
"[clode amendments had to better accommodate consumer interests for both fairness
and enactability reasons"); see also Task Force of the A.B.A., supra note 10, at 1000-
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it was enacted into law by state legislatures in the early 1960s. 17
Consumers believed that the uniform law process offered an
ideal opportunity to persuade members of the sponsoring
organizations that more comprehensive special consumer
provisions were necessary and desirable additions to Code
articles.1 8 Article 2 (Sales), described as "[tihe heart of the
Code," 19 became the rallying point for consumer groups. They
claimed that the Article's provisions, which rest on the doctrine
of freedom of contract, enabled skilled and powerful sellers to
perpetrate injustices upon unsuspecting consumers burdened
with goods which failed to meet their reasonable expectations. 20
09 (recommending that Article 2 address a number of consumer issues, including
disclaimers of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose and standard form contracts). Articles 4A (Funds Transfers), 6 (Bulk
Sales), 7 (Documents of Title) and 8 (Investment Securities) do not raise issues of
special significance to consumers. See Miller, supra note 12, at 199-200.
17 See Miller, supra note 14, at 193 ("This revision effort is widespread and not
limited as were the completed 1970s revisions to Articles 9 and 8. For that reason,
the question of the role, if any, for special consumer provisions in the Code has
arisen in this new effort for the first time since the late 1940s.").
18 Special consumer provisions are expressly applicable to contracts between
merchants and consumers and are usually nonvariable by agreement between the
parties. Most of current Article 2's provisions apply to all buyers or sellers and make
no distinction between consumer and non-consumer contracts. See infra notes 169-
73 and accompanying text.
The only express treatments of consumer matters in the original version of
Article 2 include the provisions providing for third party beneficiaries of warranties,
U.C.C. § 2-318, and making limitations on consequential damages for personal
injuries prima facie unconscionable in the case of consumer goods, id. § 2-719(3). In
1999, additional measures were added. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-502(1)(a) (providing the
circumstances under which a consumer buyer may recover goods from a seller who
is insolvent), 2-716(3) (stating that in the case of consumer goods, a buyer's right to
replevin vests upon the acquisition of a special property). A number of sections in
current Article 2 are intended to benefit all buyers, including consumers. See, e.g.,
id. §§ 2-314(1) (providing that the serving of food or drink for value creates an
implied warranty of merchantability), 2-316(2)-(3) (establishing requirements to
effectively disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability and the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose), 2-719(2) (providing that if a limited
remedy fails of its essential purpose, Article 2 remedies are available); see also id. §§
2-607 cmt. 4, 2-608 cmt. 5 (stating that certain requirements with respect to notice
are less stringent for non-merchants), 2-719 cmt. 1 (stating that "minimum
adequate remedies [must] be available" in sales contracts).
19 Karl N. Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 FLA. L.
REV. 367, 378 (1957).
20 Yvonne W. Rosmarin, Consumers-R-Us: A Reality In The U.C.C. Article 2
Revision Process, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1593, 1596 n.ll (1993) ("The fact that the
underlying assumptions upon which the current Article 2 is based do not adequately
serve in the area of consumer transactions, the realities of modern commerce, and
the Code's notion of fairness are sufficient 'criteria' for changing the Code."). See
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
They also charged that the Article's reliance upon the private
lawsuit to provide relief to aggrieved buyers was unfair to many
consumers who had neither the time nor the financial resources
to initiate litigation. 21  During the 1990s, proposals were
developed to address a variety of important issues, including
standard form contracts, disclaimers of implied warranties, and
efficient and affordable enforcement procedures. 22
After more than a decade of work by two successive drafting
committees, amendments to Article 2 have been approved by the
sponsoring organizations and will be presented to state
legislatures for adoption.23  It is evident, however, that
consumers have achieved only modest victories 24 and that Article
generally Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code Drafting Process: Will
Articles 2, 2B, and 9 Be Fair To Consumers?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 69 (1997) (outlining
consumer proposals under consideration for Articles 2, 2B and 9 and discussing
revised Articles 3 and 4 ).
21 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, The Code, The Consumer, and the Institutional
Structure of the Common Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 43-68 (1997) (criticizing Article
2's reliance upon privately initiated litigation to provide redress for grievances and
suggesting measures for reform, including government run product testing centers
and public enforcement of consumer claims).
A number of commentators recommended that Article 2 provide attorney's fees
and costs to consumers who prevail against sellers. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 14,
at 216-17 (asserting that both consumers and creditors should support attorney's
fees provisions); Rosmarin, supra note 20, at 1615-16 (arguing that attorney's fees
act as a deterrent).
22 See, e.g., John E. Murray, Jr., The Revision of Article 2: Romancing the
Prism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1447, 1491-98 (1994) (suggesting changes to
current Article 2 sections to benefit consumers); Rosmarin, supra note 20, at 1606-
33 (discussing proposals for reform). But warnings were issued early in the uniform
law process that tension between interest groups might become an obstacle to the
incorporation of special consumer provisions. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman,
Standards for Revising Article 2 of the U.C.C.: The NOM Clause Model, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1509, 1520-21 (1994) (stating that Congress provides a better forum
to address consumer issues because consensus is difficult to achieve in the uniform
law process).
23 Approval of amendments by the sponsoring organizations does not ensure
uniform enactment by the states. See Marion W. Benfield, Jr. & Peter A. Alces,
Reinventing The Wheel, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405, 1433-34 (1994) (outlining the
difficulties encountered in securing uniform and timely adoption of new articles and
amendments to existing articles); see also Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of
Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009, 1009-13, 1047-53 (2002) (providing a brief history of
the Article 2 uniform law process from 1992 to 2002).
24 See proposed U.C.C. §§ 2-103(1)(c) (providing a definition of "consumer"), 2-
103(1)(d) (defining "consumer contract"), 2-108(1)(b) (subordinating Article 2 to any
statute, administrative rule or final court decision which creates a different rule for
consumers), 2-316(2) (amending the requirements to effectively disclaim implied
warranties to provide that to disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability in a
[Vol.78:663
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2 will continue to be one of the most important bodies of law to
vigorously apply the principle of government restraint for the
purpose of preserving freedom of contract. 25 Some commentators
have suggested that the incorporation of only a small number of
special consumer provisions was necessary to ensure approval of
the amendments by the ALI and the NCCUSL and uniform
enactment by the states. 26 Other writers have concluded that
the uniform law process did not diffuse the tension between
consumers and commercial interests and that this tension
created an insurmountable obstacle to substantive changes in
Article 2's provisions.27
consumer contract "the language must be in a record, be conspicuous, and state 'The
seller undertakes no responsibility for the quality of the goods except as otherwise
provided in this contract"' and to exclude the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose in a consumer contract, the contract must state "[t]he seller
assumes no responsibility that the goods will be fit for any particular purpose for
which you may be buying these goods, except as otherwise provided in the
contract"), 2-316(3)(a) (requiring that expressions such as "as is," to exclude implied
warranties in a consumer contract evidenced by a record, be set forth conspicuously
in the record), 2-508(1)-(2) (eliminating the seller's right to cure in a consumer
contract following a justifiable revocation of acceptance), 2-718(1) (retaining the
requirements that a party seeking to enforce a liquidated damage clause in a
consumer contract to establish the difficulties of proof of loss and the inconvenience
or nonfeasibility of obtaining an adequate remedy), 2-725(1) (stating that the
applicable statute of limitations period cannot be reduced in a consumer contract).
Several new provisions benefit all buyers, including consumers. See, e.g., id. §§
2-103(1)(m) (defining a "remedial promise" as "a promise by the seller to repair or
replace the goods or to refund all or part of the price of the goods upon the
happening of a specified event"), 2-313A (providing that obligations created by a
record packaged with or accompanying new goods extend from sellers to remote
purchasers), 2-313A cmt. 1 (stating that the term "obligation" is used rather than
"warranty" because no contract exists between the seller and the remote purchaser
and because the obligation does not arise as part of the basis of the bargain as
provided in section 2-313), 2-313B (providing that obligations created by advertising
or similar communications to the public extend from sellers to remote purchasers).
25 However, some commentators are not optimistic that Article 2 will continue
to play a vital role in commercial sales transactions. See Gregory E. Maggs, The
Waning Importance of Revisions to UCC Article 2, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 595, 596,
617-21 (2003) (stating that Article 2 governs contracts worth trillions of dollars, but
concluding that the importance of the Article is diminished by the decision of the
sponsoring organizations to address computer information contracts outside of the
Article); Scott, supra note 23, at 1010 (stating that the failure of the ALI and the
NCCUSL to reach consensus on important substantive issues means that Article 2
"will inevitably become less relevant to the legal regulation of commercial sales
transactions").
26 See Miller, supra note 14, at 214 (observing that "there is consensus among
the participants in the revision process that the standard should be the ultimate
enactability of the statute in fundamentally uniform form").
27 See generally William E. Crawford, Essays in Honor of William D. Hawkland:
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The lessons to be learned, though, are not limited to why
uniform enactment is essential to the viability of a commercial
code or to an examination of how the uniform law process molded
the final products. By the early 1980s, debate over the wisdom
of consumer measures had emerged.28 Skeptics charged that
regulatory laws, which restrict freedom of contract, are neither
necessary to protect the interests of most consumers nor
desirable because they impose adverse consequences upon those
they are intended to benefit as well as upon the community as a
whole. 29 The controversy prompted Fred Miller, who served as
Executive Director of the NCCUSL during the uniform law
process, to demand that documentation be supplied to establish
both the need for and desirability of consumer proposals. 30 The
impact of the demand was immediate. Consumer advocates
could not provide data to establish the wisdom of every proposal
and, as a result, only a relatively few measures were deemed
worthy of consideration by the leadership of the Conference. 31
The purpose of this article is to explore the reasons why
consumer protection laws are controversial and to suggest how
this controversy frustrated efforts to address a number of
important consumer issues in Article 2.
Part I outlines the vision of the marketplace created by
classical contract theory. According to this vision, the exercise of
freedom of contract between parties of equal bargaining power,
knowledge, and skill provides the vehicle to facilitate the orderly
exchange of goods and services in markets of perfect competition
and to achieve liberty and fairness in the marketplace. 32 Despite
its unworldliness, this theory has provided the standard model of
analysis for courts, legislatures, and contract scholars since the
Unifying Commercial Law in the 20th Century: Understanding the Impulse and
Assessing the Effort, 62 LA. L. REV. 991 (2002) (evaluating the uniform law process,
with emphasis on the role played by industry and consumers).
28 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 8, at 815; supra notes 2-12 and accompanying
text.
29 See infra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
30 See generally Miller, supra note 14.
31 Id. at 210-13 (offering reasons why Article 2 should not incorporate a
significant number of new special consumer provisions); see also Greenfield &
Rusch, supra note 11, at 144 (stating that the absence of empirical evidence on the
effectiveness of the doctrine of unconscionability to protect consumers from unfair
contract terms "stymies attempts to reach a workable solution as neither side
acknowledges the validity of the other side's world view").
32 See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
[Vol.78:663
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late 1800s. Deviations from the theory's vision of parties as
equals have been used to justify limitations upon freedom of
contract to protect the health, safety, and economic welfare of
both the American worker and the consumer. 33
Part II explores the gap exposed during the nineteenth
century between classical theory's vision of the marketplace and
contract practices of American industrialists. Market realities
revealed that powerful capitalists exploited men, women, and
children who labored in steel mills, factories, and underground
mines. 34 Legislatures could not resist public outcry for measures
to remedy workers' grievances and, by 1920, many states
enacted laws to eradicate the evils inflicted by employers upon
their employees.3 5
Labor's struggle for justice in the workplace marked the
beginning of comprehensive legislative efforts to maintain the
vigor of the institution of contract in an imperfect world where
markets seldom mirror the ideal. However, scholars warned
that government regulations designed to protect individual
welfare may impose benefits as well as burdens upon those who
fall within the laws as well as upon others, and that such
consequences cannot always be identified and measured with
certainty at the time legislatures choose to act. They cautioned
that legislative enactments to ensure fundamental fairness
between contracting parties are experiments whose wisdom is
determined only over the course of time.36 The debate over the
merits of legislative measures to protect those who are less
powerful and skilled had emerged.
During the 1930s, inequality of bargaining power was found
to exist in markets for goods and services, prompting concern
33 See generally Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365
(1921) (discussing the limitations imposed upon freedom of contract during the early
decades of the twentieth century because equal bargaining power did not exist in
the marketplace). In recent years, some writers have questioned the usefulness of
the doctrine of inequality of bargaining power to determine the need for government
restraints upon freedom of contract. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Comment,
Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1155-56 (1976).
34 See RICHARD 0. BOYER & HERBERT M. MORAiS, LABOR'S UNTOLD STORY (3d
ed. 1994) (1955) (providing an exhaustive, but colorful, description of the labor
movement during the late 1800s and early 1900s).
35 Id. at 180.
36 See, e.g., Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and The Eight-Hour Day, 21
HARv. L. REV. 495, 506-09 (1908).
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that merchants could exploit consumers. 37 It was against this
background that work began on a uniform set of principles and
standards to govern commercial transactions in this country.
Part III explores the vision of the marketplace created in the
1940s by the drafters of Article 2. The question of whether and
to what extent government regulation of sales transactions was
necessary dominated the drafting process. In the end, the
drafters decided that the doctrine of freedom of contract, which
demands the enforcement of bargains as made, should provide
the foundation for Article 2's vision of the marketplace. 38
However, Article 2 acknowledges that disparity of bargaining
power exists in the marketplace and that freedom of contract
must be limited in the interests of fairness, at least in
extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine of unconscionability,
which is granted express recognition in section 2-302, 39 is the
only sweeping exception contained in the Article to the notion
that parties may contract upon such terms as they might
choose.40
Part IV discusses the plight of the consumer during the
1960s and 1970s. Markets were characterized by unequal
bargaining power and imperfect information.41 The gap between
contract theory and contract practice had grown. Many scholars
concluded that because the economic welfare of all consumers
was at risk, regulatory measures to address the consumers'
plight were necessary. 42  By the late 1960s, the consumer
37 See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943) (stating that form contracts
enable "powerful industrial and commercial overlords.., to impose a new feudal
order of their own making upon a vast host of vassals").
38 See infra notes 124-134 and accompanying text.
39 U.C.C. § 2-302(1) provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2003).
40 See infra notes 152-68 and accompanying text.
41 See generally Symposium, Consumer Protection, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1197
(1966) (discussing consumer issues identified in the 1960s, with special emphasis on
the lack of information available to consumers about the quality and prices of goods
and services).
42 See, e.g., Richard J. Barber, Government and the Consumer, 64 MICH. L. REV.
1203, 1221-26 (1966).
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movement was organized, triggered by widespread complaints
about defective merchandise, unfinished services, and fraud in
credit transactions. 43 Congress and state legislatures responded
to the public's demand for laws to prevent abuses in goods and
service transactions. However, within a decade after the
consumer movement gained momentum, skeptics began to
challenge the wisdom of these laws. Although many of these
challenges were unproven, they prompted intense debate over
the merits of government regulation and freedom of contract and
undermined confidence that reasonable experimentation by
legislatures ensures fairness without hampering market
efficiency.44
Finally, Part V reviews the efforts made in the 1990s to
incorporate special consumer provisions into Article 2 and
outlines the role that the decision of the NCCUSL leadership to
discourage experimentation played in preserving the doctrine of
freedom of contract.
I. NINETEENTH CENTURY CLASSICAL CONTRACT THEORY AND THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION
A. Contract Theory and the Doctrine of Freedom of Contract
Classical contract theory, which emerged in the decades
following the Civil War, had its roots in the political and
economic philosophies that prevailed in America during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 45  Political philosophy
43 See Homer Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2-10 (1969) (describing the movement and its culmination with
the passage of federal consumer credit legislation and the American Bar
Association's proposal for state action).
44 See infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
45 For an analysis of the economic and political theories that provide the
foundation for nineteenth century classical contract theory, see Morris R. Cohen,
The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 558-65 (1933).
Contract theorists agree that the institution of contract developed to meet the
need of the marketplace for a mechanism to facilitate the efficient exchange of goods
and services. Professor Kessler has observed:
With the development of a free enterprise system based on an unheard of
division of labor, capitalistic society needed a highly elastic legal
institution to safeguard the exchange of goods and services on the market.
Common law lawyers, responding to this social need, transformed
"contract" from the clumsy institution that it was in the sixteenth century
into a tool of almost unlimited usefulness and pliability. Contract thus
became the indispensable instrument of the enterpriser, enabling him to
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rested upon the proposition that "the end of man was freedom."46
"Liberty, the first of blessings, the aspiration of every human
soul, is the supreme object. Every abridgment of it demands an
excuse, and the only good excuse is the necessity of preserving it.
Whatever tends to preserve this is right, all else is wrong."47
Accordingly, the function of law was to protect and preserve
individual liberty from social controls.48  Economic theory
incorporated the doctrine of laissez-faire whereby the pursuit of
private self-interest in markets of perfect competition maximized
the good of society as a whole. According to Adam Smith, people
were guided in the marketplace by an "invisible hand."49  "By
pursuing his own interest [the individual member of society]
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than
when he really intends to promote it." 5°
Nineteenth century classical contract theory tailored these
concepts to provide the fundamental components for its vision of
the marketplace. At the center of this vision is the freedom of
go about his affairs in a rational way. Rational behavior within the context
of our culture is only possible if agreements will be respected.
Kessler, supra note 37, at 629.
46 Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought II, 30 HARV.
L. REV. 201, 204 (1917).
47 JAMES C. CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN GROWTH AND FUNCTION 337 (Da Capo
Press 1974) (1907).
48 One nineteenth century scholar wrote:
Every rule of law in itself is an evil, for it can only have for its object the
regulation of the exercise of rights, and to regulate the exercise of a right is
inevitably to limit it. On the other hand every rule of law which sanctions
a right, which preserves it from an infringement, which protects it from a
peril is good because in this way it responds to its legitimate end. Thus if
law is an evil, it is a necessary evil.
Pound, supra note 46, at 205 n.16 (quoting CHARLES BEUDANT, LE DROIT
INDIVIDUEL ET L'ETAT 148 (1891)).
49 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (Edward Cannan ed., 1937).
50 Id. Richard Barber has described the optimistic view of nineteenth century
economists:
The designers of the classical model reasoned that there would be optimal
allocation of resources if markets were competitively structured, if buyers
and sellers possessed adequate information about prices and the
availability of goods, and if sales were made without artificial restrictions
of any form .... If all of these conditions are present, so the theory goes,
utilities are maximized, and the society secures the fullest possible benefit
out of its resources. In effect, a perfect balance is struck; producers (sellers)
and consumers (buyers) are on an equal footing, and neither group will be
able to take advantage of the other.
Barber, supra note 42, at 1222.
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contract doctrine. 51 Classical theory defines freedom of contract
as the power of parties to decide whether to contract and to
determine the rights and obligations of their bargain. 52
According to this vision, obligations arise out of the exercise of
free will and a "meeting of minds."53  Freedom of contract
between parties of equal bargaining power, skill, and knowledge
preserves and enhances individual welfare. The exercise of this
freedom allows each party to express liberty and responsibility in
the marketplace and to maximize his expected utility. It ensures
fundamental fairness in contract because informed, uncoerced
consent to each term of the bargain is given by the parties.54 The
bargain contract, formed between equal parties, also meets the
demand of the marketplace for a vehicle to facilitate the orderly
51 See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 455 (1909) (noting
that the first exhaustive treatment of freedom of contract as a fundamental natural
right did not appear until the early 1890s). Professor Friedman has defined the
relationship between contract law and economic theory as follows:
The correspondence between law and economic theory was never exact.
Contract law was not a book written by Adam Smith. Nobody purposely sat
down to turn contract law into an applied branch of liberal economics. But
a free market developed, and grew; the law of contract was the legal
reflection of that market and naturally took on its characteristics. Contract
was abstract; the free market was abstract; and the two institutions
directed behavior along similar channels.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 21-22 (1965).
52 See Williston, supra note 33, at 367-69.
53 Id. at 368.
54 The view that the exercise of freedom of contract, as envisioned by classical
theory, maximizes the parties' expected utilities continues to influence
contemporary contract thinking.
A complex of social propositions supports the bargain principle. Parties are
normally the best judges of their own utility, and normally reveal their
determinations of utility in their promises. Bargain promises are normally
made in a deliberative manner for personal gain, and promises so made
should normally be kept. Bargains normally create value, enable the
parties to plan their future conduct reliably, allocate commodities to their
highest-valued uses, and best distribute the factors of production, and the
enforcement of bargain promises promotes these desirable ends.
Ultimately, these propositions, and therefore the bargain principle itself,
rest on the empirical premise that in making a bargain a contracting party
will act with full cognition to rationally maximize his subjective expected
utility.
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 211-12 (1995) (footnote omitted); see also Alan Schwartz, Karl
Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 12 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D.
Walt eds., 2000) (discussing the role that this view plays in Karl Llewellyn's
contract theory as well as in the provisions of current Article 2).
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and efficient exchange of goods and services. 55 Parties mold
contract rights and obligations to meet their expectations, thus
satisfying market needs for flexibility in contract.56
But fairness is achieved and utilities are maximized only if
freedom of contract is unrestricted by legislative enactments or
judicial decisions. 57 Accordingly, classical theory demands that
government exercise restraint.58 Government is best when it
55 The optimistic view of nineteenth century economists that the pursuit of self-
interest promotes community welfare was adopted by contract theorists to support
the proposition that harmony existed between freedom of contract and the good of
all. See generally Cohen, supra note 45; John Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure
1, 20 N.C. L. REV. 237, 237 (1942) ("We have been proud of our 'freedom of contract,'
confident that the maximum of social progress will result from encouragement of
each man's initiative and ambition by giving him the right to use his economic
powers to the full."); Kessler, supra note 37, at 640 ('The 'prestabilized harmony' of
a social system based on freedom of enterprise and perfect competition sees to it
that the 'private autonomy' of contracting parties will be kept within bounds and
will work out to the benefit of the whole.").
56 See Kessler, supra note 37, at 629 ("But the law cannot possibly anticipate
the content of an infinite number of atypical transactions into which members of the
community may need to enter. Society, therefore, has to give the parties freedom of
contract....").
57 The classic expression of freedom of contract is found in Printing &
Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, 19 L.R.-Eq. 462 (M.R. 1875).
It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those rules
which say that a given contract is void as being against public policy,
because if there is one thing which more than another public policy
requires it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have
the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered
into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by
Courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to
consider-that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of
contract.
Id. at 465.
58 Contract scholars emphasized that courts were not to inquire into the
fairness of contract terms.
[E]very person who is not from his peculiar condition or circumstances
under disability is entitled to dispose of his property in such manner and
upon such terms as he chooses; and whether his bargains are wise and
discreet, or profitable or unprofitable or otherwise, are considerations not
for courts of justice but for the party himself to deliberate upon.
I JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 337 (14th ed. 1918). The notion that each party must be
free to choose terms upon which he is willing to bargain, whether such terms are
wise or unwise, is expressed in the principle that courts will not inquire into the
adequacy of consideration. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. c
(1981).
However, courts of equity were not reluctant to scrutinize the fairness of
bargains and would refuse equitable relief when the contract was one "such as no
man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no
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governs least because "[w]e could not achieve any positive good
by law; we could only avert some evils."59
Nineteenth century scholars also believed that the
institution of contract was the key to social progress. Contract
rivaled only the church and the family in providing a principle of
organization for society.
In summary view of civil order in society, as constituted in
accordance with the individualistic ideal, performance of
contract presents itself as the chief positive element. Withdraw
contract-suppose that no one can count upon the fulfillment of
any engagement-and the members of a human community are
atoms that cannot effectively combine; the complex cooperation
and division of employments that are essential characteristics
of modern industry cannot be introduced among such beings.
Suppose contracts freely made and effectively sanctioned, and
the most elaborate social organization becomes possible, at
least in a society of such human beings as the individualistic
theory contemplates-gifted with mature reason, and governed
by enlightened self-interest. 60
B. The Common Law Tradition and Limitations Upon Freedom
of Contract
Classical contract theory, however, did not mirror the law as
interpreted and applied by the courts. By the late 1800s,
freedom of contract was limited not only by principles which
gave minors and those with mental incapacities the power to
avoid contractual obligations, but also by the doctrines of duress,
undue influence, and fraud. These exceptions acknowledge that
equal parties do not always exist in the marketplace and,
therefore, that bargains ought not be enforced as made when
inequality puts the health, safety, or economic welfare of weaker
parties at risk.61 Moreover, the notion that a "meeting of minds"
was required to form a contract gradually yielded to the concept
of manifestation of mutual assent, which induces confidence that
promises made in the course of doing business will be performed
and enforced. This confidence provides stability in contract
honest and fair man would accept on the other." Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28
Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750).
59 Pound, supra note 46, at 208 (remarking on the importance of the principle of
government restraint in nineteenth century juristic thought).
60 HENRY SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 82 (1908).
61 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, §§ 4.2-.20.
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relationships and promotes certainty that markets will function
without disruption. 62 Finally, freedom to contract was also
limited by courts that struck down penalties, forfeitures, and
contracts in restraint of trade.63
Legislatures also carved out exceptions to the principle of
government restraint. Usury statutes, prohibitions against
lotteries, and Sunday laws all made inroads upon unrestricted
self-expression, 64 prompting some scholars to caution that only
legislative enactments which serve the public good can be
reconciled with the concept of liberty.65 Although limitations
upon freedom of contract were deemed necessary to curb abuses
fostered by disparities in bargaining power, they were believed
to undermine marketplace certainty and stability. The need to
choose between liberty, which requires government restraint,
and fairness for individual parties, who are vulnerable or weak,
was described in the classic case of Henry v. Root.66 The court
observed that:
A protracted struggle has been maintained in the courts, on the
one hand, to protect infants or minors from their own
improvidence and folly, and to save them from the depredations
and frauds practised upon them by the designing and
unprincipled, and on the other, to protect the rights of those
dealing with them in good faith and on the assumption that
they could lawfully make contracts. 67
62 See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("A
contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent
of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to
certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and
represent a known intent."); see also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of
Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 273 (1986) (discussing the role that the objective
theory plays in creating certainty and stability in the marketplace).
63 These are examples given by Samuel Williston to illustrate that the power of
parties to determine contract content was limited by courts during the nineteenth
century. Williston, supra note 33, at 373-74.
64 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
65 See, e.g., SIDGWICK, supra note 60, at 162.
66 33 N.Y. 526 (1865).
67 Id. at 535-36. The tension which is created when courts intervene to protect
those who are vulnerable to unfair overreaching is noted in the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981). See, e.g., id. § 15 cmt. a ("A contract made by a
person who is mentally incompetent requires the reconciliation of two conflicting
policies: the protection of justifiable expectations and of the security of transactions,
and the protection of persons unable to protect themselves against imposition.").
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The fear that government intervention in contract affairs
would frustrate reasonable expectations and hamper market
efficiency discouraged judicial activism during the 1800s. The
doctrines of fraud and duress, for example, were narrowly
defined until well into the twentieth century. 68 By the late
1800s, however, the labor movement had emerged and workers
demanded an end to oppression in their relationships with
business. The tug of war between social control and freedom of
contract exploded, pitting labor against business and legislatures
against courts.
II. THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN CONTRACT AFFAIRS
A. The Labor Movement
Following the Civil War, the agrarian economy was changed
by the factory system and by the national railroad into an
industrial economy of mass production and national distribution.
In the new economic order, equal bargaining power did not exist
between employer and employee. The working class worked for
substandard wages from "dawn to dark."69  The pursuit of
private self-interest by powerful industrialists threatened the
health, safety, and economic welfare of thousands of men,
women, and children whose "daily [lives were] miserable because
of low wages and shocking housing conditions in the slums,
common to all the great cities."70 In 1888, President Grover
Cleveland described the struggle between business and the
working class in his annual message to Congress.
As we view the achievements of aggregated capital, we discover
the existence of trusts, combinations and monopolies, while the
citizen is struggling far in the rear or is trampled to death
beneath an iron heel. Corporations, which should be the
carefully restrained creatures of the law and the servants of the
people, are fast becoming the people's masters. ... 71
68 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, §§ 4.11, 4.18.
69 BOYER & MORAiS, supra note 34, at 79. The authors state that the average
work day in some trades was fourteen to eighteen hours and that wages were
usually between $7.50 and $8.00 per week. Id.
70 Id. at 78.
71 Id. at 65 (quoting President Grover Cleveland, Annual Message to Congress
(1888)).
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Labor's campaign to halt the oppression of workers
intensified during the late 1800s. The organization of labor
unions marked the beginning of bitter and often bloody strikes in
American cities. Widespread worker resentment and unrest
threatened to disrupt the economic welfare of Americans. By the
turn of the century, the tide began to turn and many states
adopted laws to provide for workman's compensation and
minimum wages, to limit the working day, and to restrict child
labor.72
On the other hand, nineteenth century jurisprudence
retained its vigor for some of this country's intellectual elite. 73
The United States Supreme Court declared many state economic
regulations designed to benefit workers to be void on the grounds
that they were an unwarranted and arbitrary interference with
an individual's right to contract freely. 74 Liberty of contract
found its most rigorous expression in the classic case of Lochner
v. New York 75 in which the Court declared unconstitutional a
New York law that prohibited the employment of bakery workers
for more than ten hours per day or sixty hours per week. Liberty
of contract, the Court reasoned, was a fundamental property
right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 76
The Court declared that the New York law could not be upheld
as a labor law or as a health law77 because it ran counter to "that
72 Id. at 180.
73 Some scholars opposed legislative measures that established maximum
hours of labor on the basis that they were "uncompromisingly anti-individualistic."
SIDGWICK, supra note 60, at 162.
74 See Jessica E. Hacker, Comment, The Return to Lochnerism? The Revival of
Economic Liberties from David to Goliath, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 675, 686 (2002)
(noting that after 1905, the Supreme Court struck down more than two hundred
state economic regulations designed to protect American workers). See generally
SIDGWICK, supra note 60, at 162 n.1 ("But so far as the admitted effect of the
measure is to diminish the amount of daily service rendered by the labourer to
society, I think that no government ought to take the responsibility of causing the
consequent loss of wealth to individuals and to the community as a whole."); Pound,
supra note 51, at 482 ("But one cannot read the cases in detail without feeling that
the great majority of the decisions are simply wrong, not only in constitutional law,
but from the standpoint of the common law, and even from that of a sane
individualism").
75 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
76 Id. at 64 ("[T]he freedom of... contract ... cannot be prohibited or interfered
with, without violating the Federal Constitution.").
77 See id. at 57-61.
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liberty of person and of free contract provided for in the Federal
Constitution."78
Radical jurisprudence, though, was not sufficiently powerful
in comparison to the country's need to address the economic and
social issues generated by the Great Depression. By the early
1930s, Supreme Court decisions signaled a change in judicial
thinking.79 The notion that legislatures have power to limit
freedom of contract "where it is conceived that public policy
requires it... unless limitations are arbitrary or wanton
interference with liberty"80 gradually became embedded in
modern contract jurisprudence.
It is a saving characteristic of Anglo-American case law, that
decisions upon an unsound principle are gradually surrounded
by a mass of exceptions, distinctions and limitations which
preclude extension for the future and soon enable the current of
judicial decision to flow normally. Just as in the natural body
foreign substances are encysted and walled in and thus
deprived of power for evil, the body of our case law has the
faculty of encysting and walling in rules and doctrines at
variance with a sound condition of the law. Such a process has
long been going on with respect to extreme doctrines of liberty
of contract.8 1
Many scholars applauded the efforts of legislatures to
address workers' grievances.8 2 Unlimited freedom of contract,
they declared, secures individual and community welfare only in
theory and theory does not mirror the real world where
inequalities exist.8 3  They were confident that reasonable
experimentation by legislatures would find that combination of
78 Id. at 62.
79 See Hacker, supra note 74, at 687 (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934) (confirming the Court's rejection of its reasoning in Lochner)).
80 Williston, supra note 33, at 378; see also Pound, supra note 51, at 482-86
(noting that such limitations had always existed in the law, but conceding that they
were unrecognized by some jurists who insisted upon applying the concept of liberty
of contract as envisioned by nineteenth century theorists).
81 Pound, supra note 51, at 484.
82 Id. at 483 ("Surely what equity has done to abridge freedom of contract,
legislation may do likewise.").
83 See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, From Maximum Wages to Minimum Wages: Six
Centuries of Regulation of Employment Contracts, 43 COLUM. L. REV 643, 643
(1943) ("The modern period has been one in which a new impulse towards
regulation has gathered strength as a result of our experience of the evils to which
unlimited freedom of contract gives rise in an industrial society characterized by
extreme inequalities of wealth and bargaining power.").
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government control and freedom of contract that maintains
harmony between the interests of individual parties and the
good of the community as a whole.8 4 In his classic essay, Due
Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day,8 5 Learned Hand warned
that this confidence must be tempered with the knowledge that
legislative enactments that limit freedom of contract for the
purpose of protecting the welfare of workers entail consequences
for these workers as well as for others and that only experience
determines what these consequences are and whether they can
be measured with certainty.8 6 Hand's observations had taken on
a sense of urgency. For decades, courts had recognized that
government intervention intended to protect those who are at
risk creates tension between the desire to achieve just results
and the need to maintain certainty and stability in contract
relationships. It was evident that the effects of court rules,
which protect those who were vulnerable to unfair overreaching,
could not rival, at least in scope, the results of legislative action
which controls terms and conditions of employment for scores of
Americans. The question of whether legislative measures which
restrict freedom of contract benefit those within their terms
without imposing excessive expense or injury upon others
triggered a debate that lingers to this day.8 7
B. Government Regulation and the Need to Experiment
In his essay, Learned Hand condemned the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Lochner v. New York on the
84 Samuel Williston acknowledged the need for experimentation to determine
the wisdom of limitations upon freedom of contract.
The extent to which freedom of contract should be limited inevitably
becomes a question of degree to which not even an attempt at an answer
can be made without reference to time, place and circumstance; and there
is nothing in our Constitutions which should prevent reasonable
experiment to aid in the decision.
Williston, supra note 33, at 379.
s5 Hand, supra note 36.
86 Id. at 507-08.
87 Hand identified the issues raised by a law that limits freedom in the
interests of individual contracting parties.
That is, there can be no question that such a regulation actually affects the
"welfare" of the persons within its terms; but there may well be a question
whether, all things considered, it affects them beneficially, or, if
beneficially, whether it does not do so at a corresponding expense
arbitrarily imposed upon other persons.
Id. at 503.
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grounds that the Court had exceeded its power in declaring the
law void. "In this way the principle may be observed that with
the expediency of the statute the court has no concern, but only
with the power of the legislature. 88 In prior decades, courts had
declined to strike down laws that regulated working conditions
in factories and mines, making it too late, Hand noted, to
question the power of the legislature to enact laws which set
maximum hours of labor.8 9
For the state to intervene to make more just and equal the
relative strategic advantages of the two parties to the contract,
of whom one is under the pressure of absolute want, while the
other is not, is as proper a legislative function as that it should
neutralize the relative advantages arising from fraudulent
cunning or from superior physical force. 90
Moreover, it is only appropriate, Hand declared, that this
power rest with the legislature, the "more genuinely
representative" 9' branch of government. The result of a law that
limits freedom of contract is a matter over which there can be
reasonable debate, and legislatures, under these circumstances,
are better suited than courts to determine whether the state
should intervene or leave market forces unchanged.
Legislatures must acknowledge this uncertainty and "answer the
problems which it raises, with such wisdom as society can
collectively muster."92
According to Hand, the law struck down by the Supreme
Court in Lochner v. New York illustrates the uncertainty which
surrounds the relative merits of freedom of contract and
government regulation. One theory is that such a law does not
benefit workers because it means a reduction in pay and "an
enforced leisure they may not want."93 Moreover, a law which
mandates a shorter workday may decrease productivity, causing
an increase in the price of goods and services or a loss to the
employer. 94 Such a theory, Hand observed, may not be true. It
may be that such a law does not entail unwanted burdens for
workers or for others. A shorter workday may improve the
88 Id. at 500.
89 Id. at 502.
90 Id. at 506.
91 Id. at 508.
92 Id. at 507.
93 Id. at 504.
94 See id.
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health of workers, though such a result cannot be measured with
precision.95 Moreover, "[t]he indirect effects upon the morale of
workers and the stimulus to improvement in the technique of the
arts arising from a shorter day may indeed be enough to make
up economically for their apparent decreased production."96
Under these circumstances, loss to the consumer or to the
capitalist is avoided. Neither theory, though, is proven and "that
throws the whole matter open for exclusive consideration, and
for exclusive determination, by the legislature. 97
In short, the whole matter is yet to such an extent experimental
that no one can with justice apply to the concrete problems the
yardstick of abstract economic theory. We do not know, and we
cannot for a long time learn, what are the total results of such
"meddlesome interference with the rights of the individual." He
would be as rash a theorist who should assert with certainty
their beneficence, as he who would sweep them all aside by
virtue of some pragmatical theory of "natural rights." The only
way in which the right, or the wrong, of the matter may be
shown, is by experiment; and the legislature, with its
paraphernalia of committee and commission, is the only public
representative really fitted to experiment.98
In drawing the line between legislative power and judicial
power, Hand identified the dilemma that legislatures face when
choosing between freedom of contract and government
regulation. If legislators choose to intervene because they
believe that inequalities have fostered injustice, they enter
uncharted waters for they do not know whether benefits or
burdens will flow from their actions and whether these effects
can be accurately measured. Thus, uncertainty is inevitable in
the struggle to end the evils which exist in the marketplace and
to find that combination of social control and freedom of contract
which best serves contract objectives. "The result stands in trial,
not in dialectic; but we must insist upon the reasonable
expectation of those who view it hopefully, and we must seek to
advance it, at least until it has been demonstrated to be false."99
95 See id. at 504-05.
96 Id. at 505.
97 Id. at 507.
98 Id. at 507-08 (citations omitted).
99 Learned Hand, The Hope of the Minimum Wage, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 20,
1915, at 66-67, quoted in GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE
JUDGE 251 (1994).
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III. ARTICLE 2 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A. The Shortcomings of the Uniform Sales Act
In the early twentieth century, the organization of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade
Commission, and state administrative agencies, such as
insurance departments, indicated an increasing reliance upon
government regulation of essential services and contracts to
protect the public interest. Liberty of contract, as envisioned by
classical contract theory, was declared to be "one of the most
pervasive and persistent vices of reasoning on practical affairs,
to wit, the setting-up of premises that are too wide for our
purpose and indefensible on their own account."'100 During the
1930s, government regulation continued to expand, driven
forward by President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. On the
other hand, modern contract jurisprudence, which signaled a
retreat from radical individualism, was only in its infancy, and
the free market model remained the model of choice to govern
sales of goods transactions. The provisions of the Uniform Sales
Act of 1906 (the "Sales Act") were constructed upon this model
and mirrored common law rules created by courts during the
nineteenth century. 10 By the late 1930s, there was widespread
agreement that its provisions were obsolete, frustrating both
fairness and efficiency in the marketplace. 10 2
The principles of the Sales Act did not address, much less
remedy, injustices perpetrated by merchants who were willing to
100 Cohen, supra note 45, at 559. During the 1930s and 1940s, numbers of
writers criticized classical contract theory on the grounds that it failed to mirror
contract practice. See, e.g., John P. Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair
Exchange in French and German Law, 11 TUL. L. REV. 345, 345 (1937) ("The system
of 'free' contract described by nineteenth century theory is now coming to be
recognized as a world of fantasy, too orderly, too neatly contrived, and too
harmonious to correspond with reality."); Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of
Quality, and Society: II, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341, 409 (1937).
101 The Uniform Sales Act was enacted in 36 states. See Zipporah Batshaw
Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARv.
L. REV. 465, 483 (1987); see also Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying
Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1341, 1341-42, 1347-51 (1948) (criticizing these
provisions); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 558,
558-60 (1940) (same).
102 See Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal
Realism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325, 335
0995) ("The common law and the traditional constitutional system were not only
inefficient, but were also incapable of protecting individuals.").
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deviate from market norms of honesty, decency, and fairness.
The existence of cut-throat competition, the manufacture of
shoddy and defective merchandise, and the payment of
substandard wages were symptoms of an economic order 10 3
where "that precious commodity Justice must be viewed as being
as scarce as the scarcer economic goods."'10 4 The plight of the
consumer attracted only modest attention. Although Congress
had enacted some laws to protect the health and safety of
Americans placed at risk by the sale of adulterated and untested
food and drugs, there were no systematic efforts to address
consumers' economic welfare. 10 5 The legislatures' indifference
was not surprising. Consumers were not organized in the 1930s
to lobby for reform measures and attempts to identify the causes
of economic loss were just beginning. Scholarly writings, which
explored consumers' plight, focused almost exclusively on the
manufacture and sale of dangerous and defective products 06 and
on the use of the standard form contract in goods and service
transactions. 107 Although standard contracts were the most
efficient and effective method of doing business in an economy of
mass production and mass distribution, the opportunity to
bargain over terms was either limited or non-existent. Scholars
acknowledged that these contracts were necessary to meet the
demands of an industrial economy, 08 but they lamented that
103 Professor Kamp made the following observation:
The pre-Keynesian macro-economists believed that business was caught in
a vicious cycle. They thought that overproduction led to lower prices and
"chiseling," the lessening of the quality of goods and cheating, which
further caused lower wages, decreased demand, overproduction, and,
finally, lower prices and chiseling again. This process was further
characterized by chaotic fluctuations in production, poor quality goods,
ruinous cut-throat competition, and wages too low to allow workers and
their families to maintain minimum standards of health and welfare.
Id. at 365-66 (citations omitted).
104 Llewellyn, supra note 100, at 401.
105 See Barber, supra note 42, at 1205-17 (discussing federal and state efforts to
protect consumers' health, safety, and economic welfare during the early decades of
the twentieth century); Philip A. Hart, Can Federal Legislation Affecting
Consumers'Economic Interests Be Enacted?, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1255, 1255-58 (1966).
106 See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 100, at 404-08.
107 See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 37, at 631-33; Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price
Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 731-34 (1931); Karl N.
Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REV. 700, 700-01 (1939).
108 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 45, at 589. Standard form contracts continue to
be regarded as indispensable to the efficient transaction of business in our modern
economy. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211, cmt. a (1981); see
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merchants, who had superior bargaining power, could use that
power to impose terms which denied relief to aggrieved
consumers. 10 9 As Llewellyn lamented, "What is certain is that
the spreading vogue of draftsmanship has carried lop-sided
manipulation into the game of Sales Law-and especially as
against an ultimate-consumer-buyer." 110
Courts were caught between existing common law principles
that assumed equal bargaining power, knowledge and skill and
the realities of contract practice. Although the principle of
caveat emptor was on the decline,"' the rule that a party is
bound to a contract even though the contract is unread or its
contents not understood continued to dominate judicial decision-
making." 2 In extraordinary circumstances, courts did provide
relief to those who had executed standard form contracts that
contained harsh and oppressive non-negotiated terms. Such
relief, however, usually flowed from the manipulation of common
law principles and doctrines, 113 a practice condemned by contract
scholars. 1 4
Moreover, scores of judicial decisions highlighted the harm
to market efficiency caused by the application of outdated and
inflexible common law and statutory principles to resolve
also Slawson, supra note 11, at 529-30 (stating that standard form contracts
"account for more than ninety-nine percent of all contracts now made" and that
their "predominance ... is the best evidence of their necessity").
109 See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 37, at 640.
110 Llewellyn, supra note 100, at 394.
- See W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1936) (remarking on the judicial trend away from rigid application of the
doctrine of caveat emptor). But see Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat
Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1187 (1931) ("But, lest there be mistake about it, caveat
emptor is not yet a historical doctrine .... The protection accorded the buyer is as
yet neither broad nor certain.").
112 "(Ilt is as much the duty of a person who cannot read the language in which
a contract is written to have someone read it to him before he signs it, as it is the
duty of one who can read to peruse it himself before signing it." Stern v.
Moneyweight Scale Co., 42 App. D.C. 162, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1914) (citation omitted).
This principle continues to influence judicial thinking. See, e.g., Nat'l Bank of
Washington v. Equity Investors, 506 P.2d 20, 36 (Wash. 1973) ('The whole panoply
of contract law rests on the principle that one is bound by the contract which he
voluntarily and knowingly signs.").
113 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 4.26 (outlining the techniques used by
courts to reach just results).
114 In a much quoted criticism, Karl Llewellyn wrote: "The net effect is
unnecessary confusion and unpredictability, together with inadequate remedy, and
evil persisting that calls for remedy. Covert tools are never reliable tools."
Llewellyn, supra note 107, at 703.
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contract disputes between merchants. 115 The drafters tailored
the provisions of the Sales Act to meet the needs of an agrarian
economy characterized by short term, single transactions
between merchants and customers who negotiated face to face.
In the years following its adoption by state legislatures, new
methods of doing business were developed to meet the needs of
an industrial economy. As one commentator noted, "Horse law
and hay stack law are uneasily tolerated in the complex business
of mass production and national distribution."'116 In the new
economic order, merchants frequently contracted for
performance to occur over a long period of time. Such contracts
were often incomplete in one or more of their terms because
parties failed to agree on all essential terms or to provide for
unforeseen events. Existing principles were often rigidly applied
to render such contracts unenforceable, frustrating the intent of
the parties." 7  Moreover, some courts applied traditional
principles in a mechanical fashion and declared output and
requirements contracts to be void for failure to satisfy the
requirement of mutuality of obligation. These decisions
hampered the development of new and efficient forms of doing
business. Other courts, however, refused to be bound by
outdated rules and concluded that such contracts were
enforceable."1 " Contract principles were inconsistent, creating
uncertainty in the marketplace over which promises, among all
promises, would be enforced. The need for a code to provide a
complete and all-inclusive system of principles and doctrines
emerged." 9
115 See Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century,
39 S.C. L. REV. 415, 415-19 (1988) (discussing some of these cases and how courts
used the concept of good faith to bridge the gap between obsolete contract principles
and the needs of modern commerce).
116 Gilmore, supra note 101, at 1341.
117 See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
2.9 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing the traditional common law rules regarding
indefiniteness in contract terms); see also U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2003) (providing that
"[e]ven though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for
indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.").
113 See Pratt, supra note 115, at 443-50 (discussing judicial treatment of output
and requirements contracts during the early 1900s); see also U.C.C. § 2-306.
Comment 2 to section 2-306 states that output and requirements contracts are
neither too indefinite nor lacking in mutuality of obligation. Id. § 2-306 cmt. 2.
119 See William D. Hawkland, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Civil
Codes, 56 LA. L. REV. 231, 231-35 (1995) (discussing the reasons why the common
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B. Article 2 and the Need for Compromise
It was against this background that efforts to modernize
commercial law in this country began. In 1942, Karl Llewellyn
was appointed by the ALI and the NCCUSL to serve as chief
reporter for the Code and principle draftsman for Article 2.120
The Article 2 Drafting Committee faced difficult choices. By
1940, scholars had conceded that the institution of contract had
lost some of its vigor as an organizing principle for society. 121
Nonetheless, they remained confident that the institution could
continue to maximize individual welfare and promote the
common good if changes were made in the free market model
and uniform principles were developed to govern the formation,
performance, and enforcement of the bargain contract.122 Some
law system had failed to produce certainty and uniformity in the law and explaining
why the drafters of the UCC believed that a code would achieve these objectives).
120 "Despite the numbers of persons involved in the drafting of the Code, the
extent to which it reflects Llewellyn's philosophy of law and his sense of commercial
wisdom and need is startling." Soia Mentschikoff, Highlights of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 27 MOD. L. REV. 167, 168 n.3 (1964); see also Allen R. Kamp,
Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1949-54, 49 BUFF. L.
REV. 359, 359-91 (2001) (discussing the drafting process and Karl Llewellyn's
contributions to the Code); Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform
Commercial Code: 1940-49, 51 SMU L. REV. 275 (1998) [hereinafter Kamp, Uptown
Act] (same); A. Brooke Overby, Modeling UCC Drafting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645,
650-56 (1996) (providing a history of the sponsoring organizations).
Several commentators have analyzed Llewellyn's contract theory as reflected in
his writings published between 1925 and 1940. See Schwartz, supra note 54; Scott,
supra note 23, at 1014-46. Other writings have focused on Llewellyn's views as
reflected in Article 2's provisions. See, e.g., Richard Danzig, A Comment on the
Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975); John
L. Gedid, U.C.C. Methodology: Taking A Realistic Look at the Code, 29 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 341 (1988); Wiseman, supra note 101.
121 "The enormous growth of the corporation... has meant a further decrease
in the importance of contract as an organizing force, since the corporation and
vertical integration tend to substitute for an organization resting on contract one
resting on the relation of superior and inferior." L.L. Fuller & William R. Purdue,
Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: I, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 63 n.13 (1936).
122 A number of scholars have discussed Llewellyn's commitment to
fundamental contract objectives. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 54. Professor
Danzig has observed that Llewellyn admitted that his knowledge of the
consequences of contracting was limited.
It is interesting that in his academic writings Llewellyn claimed that he
shared a concern for the effects of transactions on those other than the
parties to the transaction, but, as in his response to Pound about goal
orientation, he pleaded that for the moment he lacked the time or
knowledge to deal with that dimension.
Danzig, supra note 120, at 630 n.33.
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scholars believed that government regulation of sales
transactions was inevitable, especially in the interests of
consumers. 123 Still, no one had created a new vision of the
marketplace that identified the degree to which freedom of
contract should be limited. The drafting of Article 2 provided the
opportunity to define this vision.
The question of whether Article 2 should incorporate
regulatory measures to address lopsided bargains and the sale of
defective merchandise created tension among the members of
the Drafting Committee. 124 The final work product did not
include innovative measures, such as strict liability for
dangerous product defects, 125 suggested by Llewellyn during the
1940s. 126 In the end, Llewellyn was forced to compromise in
order to ensure approval by the sponsoring organizations and
uniform enactment by the states, 127 and compromise produced a
system of principles and doctrines that struck a balance in favor
of both freedom from government intrusion and freedom to
contract upon such terms as the parties might choose. 128
123 See Gilmore, supra note 101, at 1358.
124 See Wiseman, supra note 101, at 467 (stating that the Code "was the result
of a sometimes painful twenty year period of compromise among a broad range of
participants").
125 Other proposals included fact finding merchant juries, regulation of
standard form contracts, and control of remedy modifications. See Kamp, supra note
120, at 281, 294-95; Wiseman, supra note 120, at 526-27.
126 See Wiseman, supra note 101, at 520 (stating that opposition to the
merchant rules, for example, was based on the perception that Llewellyn intended
to use the rules "to impose upon merchants his own normative vision of what those
practices should be").
127 Llewellyn expressed disappointment that compromise was necessary to
ensure consensus. In 1953, he wrote:
I am ashamed of it in some ways; there are so many pieces that I could
make a little better; there are so many beautiful ideas I tried to get in that
would have been good for the law, but I was voted down. A wide body of
opinion has worked the law into some sort of compromise after debate and
after exhaustive work. However, when you compare it with anything that
there is, it is an infinite improvement.
Karl Llewellyn, Why A Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779, 784 (1953).
128 Professor Kamp has identified the opposing viewpoints that emerged during
the drafting process:
Llewellyn wanted to create a commercial law consistent with both his
anthropological vision and the folkways of merchants; Wall Street wanted
to achieve an efficient, persuasive, profit-maximizing commercial regime
based on individual contracting. There are three themes that constantly
recur in Llewellyn's thought: the primacy of trade usages, the goal of
modernistic efficiency, and the need for balanced trade rules. The history
of the drafting of the U.C.C., therefore, is the story of how the drafters
2004] ARTICLE 2 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 691
C. Freedom of Contract as Defined by Current Article 2
Freedom of contract provides the fundamental component of
Article 2's structure. 129 The doctrine, as envisioned by Article 2,
is striking in both its similarities to and differences from the
doctrine as defined by classical contract theory. The Article's
definition is reminiscent of the classical doctrine in its reliance
upon the notion that parties are better suited than courts or
legislatures to determine the terms of their bargain. 130
Both contract-right and exemption by contract from duty have
been from early times in the nature of privilege accorded by law
for a reason. The reason was, for almost a century, that the
animals probably knew their own business better than their
keeper did-a theory which has not only charm but virtue, most
of the time. 131
Thus, with only limited exceptions,1 32 parties may vary the
effect of Article 2's provisions, including those which create
standard terms, 133  and they may customize rights and
obligations to meet their unique needs and expectations. The
Article's definition of freedom of contract rests upon the
assumptions, borrowed from classical theory, that parties
possess relatively equal bargaining power, knowledge, and skill
and that enforcement of bargains as made will maximize utilities
and promote efficiency in the marketplace. 134
attempted to make room for each vision, to choose between the visions, and
to come up with devices that would mediate between them.
Kamp, Uptown Act, supra note 120, at 283 (footnote omitted).
129 U.C.C. § 1-302(a) provides in part that "the effect of provisions... may be
varied by agreement." U.C.C. § 1-302(a) (2003). Professor Schwartz observed:
"Llewellyn paid considerable attention to freedom of contract issues... because of
the epistemological role that actual contracting played in his theory. When parties
contracted under ideal conditions, the deal would maximize the utility of both."
Schwartz, supra note 54, at 31; see also Scott, supra note 23, at 1025-29 (stating
that Llewellyn preferred "selective" regulation over mandatory rules).
130 "The Code emphasizes that we should not be making contracts for the
parties-a view that was espoused at common law but often smothered by technical
requirements." John E. Murray, Jr., The Revision of Article 2: Romancing the Prism,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1447, 1451 (1994).
131 Llewellyn, supra note 100, at 403.
132 See infra notes 153-68 and accompanying text.
133 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-303 to -315.
134 Professor Schwartz has concluded that Llewellyn's most important
contribution to contract law was the development of a "general approach to the legal
analysis of contract." Schwartz, supra note 54, at 18. He observed:
Llewellyn's general substantive and institutional approaches to sales and
contract law remain relevant. Modern law and economic scholars believe,
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Article 2, however, departs from classical theory in order to
accommodate Llewellyn's vision of merchant reality. Classical
theory assumed that "all obligation would arise only out of the
will of the individual contracting freely.' 1 35 By the end of the
nineteenth century, courts had abandoned the principle that
assent to contract requires a "meeting of minds" in favor of the
objective theory that a "contract is an obligation attached by the
mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words,
which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent."136
The view that each party was an autonomous actor in the
marketplace did, though, remain unchanged. 137 Article 2 rejects
this view and replaces it with a vision of the party whose
"individual will... is a social product, unique in its particular
needs and desires, but fundamentally constituted according to
communal norms."'138
Llewellyn relied upon prevailing theories of anthropology
and economics, which studied groups and how they work, to
develop the concepts of merchant groups and merchant self-
regulation through trade usage.139 He believed that markets are
composed of merchant groups and that, over the course of time,
each group establishes its own "practice[s] [and] method[s] of
with Llewellyn, that the state should pursue efficiency in the contract area
because efficiency is the only implementable goal. And efficiency should be
pursued, by and large, in the ways that Llewellyn advocated: Courts
should enforce the deals that parties make, which requires courts to
understand the economics of commercial transactions.
Id.; see also Donald A. Farber, Economic Efficiency and the Ex Ante Perspective, in
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 54
(2000) (discussing what role, if any, the principle of efficiency should play in
contemporary contract analysis).
135 See Cohen, supra note 45, at 558.
136 Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of New York, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
137 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CASE STUDY 21 (1965) (observing that nineteenth century models of
contract law and economics treated parties as "individual economic units which, in
theory, enjoyed complete mobility and freedom of decision").
138 Amy H. Kastely, Stock Equipment for the Bargain in Fact: Trade Usage,
"Express Terms" and Consistency Under Section 1-205 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 777, 814-15 (1986); see also Kamp, supra note 102, at 395
(stating that "freedom of contract, or at least an individual's freedom of contract, is
not a principle of the UCC").
139 See Kamp, supra note 102, at 345-71; see also David Ray Papke, How the
Cheyenne Indians Wrote Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 47 BUFF. L.
REV. 1457, 1459-62 (1999) (discussing the prevailing anthropological, contract, and
economic theories that influenced Llewellyn).
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dealing."140  When a practice or method of dealing has "such
regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to
justify as expectation that it will be observed with respect to the
transaction in question," it rises to the level of trade usage. 141
Trade usage serves two separate, but related, functions. First,
Article 2 incorporates trade usage, along with course of
performance 142 and course of dealing, 143 to explain, supplement,
140 See U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (2003).
141 Id. "Usage of trade" is defined as "any practice or method of dealing having
such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question." Id.
Comment 4 to U.C.C. § 1-303, states: "There is room also for proper recognition
of usage agreed upon by merchants in trade codes." Id. § 1-303 cmt. 4; see also David
Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REv., 842, 843 (1999)
(expounding the view that Llewellyn failed to fully appreciate how trade
associations work).
Comment 4 also provides that "full recognition is thus available for new usages
and for usages currently observed by the great majority of decent dealers, even
though dissidents ready to cut corners do not agree." U.C.C. § 1-303 cmt. 4.
Professor Danzig uses this comment as the starting point to illustrate what he
believes to be a flaw in Article 2's vision.
Who are "commercially decent dealers"? What, at the margins, are the
indices of decency and indecency? What if "decent" practices, as a judge
perceives them, are not those of the "great majority," but instead those of
the dissidents? The presumption appears to be that what is "commercially
decent" and what is "unconscionable," what is "good faith" and what is bad
faith, what is good law and what is bad law will be self-evident to one who
carefully studies the situation. It is apparently an axiom of this approach
that "good law" cannot be described for courts, but they will know it when
they see it.
This approach is disturbing .... First ... it tends to confine the impact of
the law to a reaffirmation of the predominate morals of the marketplace.
Practices well below the market's moral median may be constrained, but
since the median is the standard, by definition it will be unaffected.
Further, this approach seems to encourage exactly that which "realism"
was supposed to discourage: a projection of a judge's values onto the scene
before him ....
Danzig, supra note 120, at 629-30; see also John E. Murray, Jr., The Article 2
Prism: The Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 21
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 19-20 (1981) (replying to this view).
142 U.C.C. § 1-303(a) provides:
A "course of performance" is a sequence of conduct between the parties to a
particular transaction that exists if:
(1) the agreement of the parties with respect to the transaction involves
repeated occasions for performance by a party; and
(2) the other party, with knowledge of the nature of the performance and
opportunity for objection to it, accepts the performance or acquiesces in it
without objection.
U.C.C. § 1-303(a).
143 U.C.C. § 1.303(b) defines "course of dealing' as "a sequence of conduct
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and even qualify express terms of the parties' agreement.144 In
other words, the total legal obligations of the parties are to be
found not only in their words, but also in the totality of the
circumstances in which they do business. 145 Second, trade usage
provides the foundation upon which the notion of merchant self-
governance is constructed. Practices and methods of dealing
create norms to guide the contract behavior of group members. 146
Of particular concern to Llewellyn was the contract chiseler
whose unscrupulous conduct was believed to create an economic
spiral downward to cutthroat competition and to the
manufacture of shoddy merchandise. According to Article 2's
vision, merchant-generated norms control the chiseler and, thus,
protect the market position of the group to which he belongs. 147
concerning previous transactions between the parties to a particular transaction
that is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for
interpreting their expressions and other conduct." Id. § 1-303(b).
144 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3) states in part: 'Agreement'... means the bargain of
the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances,
including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade as provided in
Section 1-303." Id. § 1-201(b)(3).
The Code distinguishes between "agreement" and "contract." U.C.C. § 1-
201(b)(12) provides in part: 'Contract'... means the total legal obligation that
results from the parties' agreement." Id. § 1-201(b)(12).
145 Professor Richard Danzig was one of the first scholars to criticize Article 2's
incorporation principle, which he understood to mean that courts should find
customs in the business context, and use these customs to resolve business disputes.
Danzig, supra note 120, at 628-31; see also Schwartz, supra note 54, at 21-22
(arguing that Llewellyn did not intend norms of business to be controlling to resolve
disputes between merchants). The debate over the principle of incorporation
intensified with the publication of Professor Lisa Bernstein's article in which she
concluded that "the Code's conception of widely known commercial standards and
usages that are geographically coextensive with the scope of trade does not
correspond to merchant reality but rather is a legal fiction whose usefulness and
desirability needs to be demonstrated and defended." Lisa Bernstein, The
Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary
Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 777 (1999). See generally Jody S. Kraus & Steven D.
Walt, In Defense of the Incorporation Strategy, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 193 (2000); David V. Snyder,
Language and Formalities in Commercial Contracts: A Defense of Custom and
Conduct, 54 SMU L. REV. 617 (2001).
146 Professor Kamp has provided the most exhaustive treatment of the roles
that Llewellyn envisioned for trade usage. See Kamp, supra note 102, at 347-60;
Kamp, Uptown Act, supra note 120, at 281-93.
147 Professor Kamp suggests that one of the principal purposes of trade norms
was to control "[t]he individual at the margins [who] is neither a member of a
minority group nor the non-conformist whose rights deserve the protection of the
law .... The merchant who deviates from group standards is not the
entrepreneurial hero, but the cut-throat competitor. Group norms are good; the
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Trade usages, when combined with Article 2's merchant rules 148
and standards, such as good faith149  and commercial
reasonableness, 150 channel the exercise of freedom of contract by
creating a market climate which encourages compliance with
commercial norms of decency and fairness. 151
legal problem is enforcing them." Id. at 288.
148 Article 2 contains 13 merchant rules. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-201(2) (merchant
exception to the Statute of Frauds), 2-205 (written assurance of a firm offer binding
without consideration), 2-314(1) (warranty of merchantability is implied in contract
when the seller is "a merchant with respect to goods of that kind"); see also
Wiseman, supra note 120, at 503-12 (explaining the role that merchant rules play
in Llewellyn's effort to create a better "merchant reality"). Professor Wiseman
stated:
Llewellyn... did not simply try to make sales law more realistic or closer
to the patterns of actual merchant transactions. Some of his rules sought
to establish at least some outer bounds of unfairness between merchants in
their dealings... In offering these provisions, Llewellyn's target was the
worst of the "shapers," and his goal was to impose his vision of the fair rule
for merchants.
Id. at 506 (footnotes omitted).
149 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 1-
201(b)(20). This definition is a change from former U.C.C. § 1-201(19) which defined
"good faith" as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." See U.C.C.
§ 2-201(19) (Draft for Discussion Only 2000), available at Nat'l Conference of
Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Revision of Uniform Commercial Code Article 1-
General Provisions, at 3.
U.C.C. § 1-304 provides: "Every contract or duty within [the Uniform
Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and
enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-304; see also Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of
a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1
(1981) (discussing the doctrine of good faith); Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in
General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54
VA. L. REV. 195 (1968) (same).
150 Professor John E. Murray defends Article 2's reliance upon undefined
concepts.
The overriding standards of commercial reasonableness, honesty-in-fact,
conscionability and, yes, decency, are the ultimate principles which may
not be overcome in any application of Article 2.... Article 2 not only
enables but directs courts to impose their understanding of commercial
morality on the market place. ... The only alternative appears to be a
commercial code based upon a mechanical jurisprudence. But a mechanical
jurisprudence is unworkable ....
Murray, supra note 141, at 19-20; see also Kamp, supra note 102, at 384 (observing
that the standard of reasonableness "gives courts the power to regulate the bargain
and the behavior of parties to sales contracts"). But see Robert K. Rasmussen, The
Uneasy Case against the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 LA. L. REV. 1097, 1100
(2002) (observing that "the vague standards of Article 2 leave so much room for
differing judicial interpretations that Article 2 fails to provide similar results across
jurisdictions").
151 Many writers prefer the phrase "principle of private autonomy" to describe
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Although Article 2's vision of market reality departs from
classical theory's view of the marketplace, it does not disturb the
notion that parties should determine the rights and obligations
of their bargain. Trade customs are not mandated by courts or
by legislatures, because they are created by the groups to which
merchants belong. Although merchant rules and standards
guide contract behavior during the course of doing business, they
do not dictate contract content. Thus, Article 2 preserves the
fundamental component of classical theory that parties have the
power to determine whether to contract and to establish the
terms upon which they are willing to do business.
D. Limitations upon Freedom of Contract
The drafters of Article 2 did, though, return to the common
law tradition, at least to the extent that they recognized that
limitations must be imposed upon free bargaining and free
contract in order to preserve basic market values. Pursuant to
section 1-103(b), the doctrines of fraud, duress, and undue
influence supplement Article 2's provisions as do principles that
grant minors and those with mental incapacities the power to
avoid contract obligations. 152  Section 1-302(b) prohibits
disclaimers of the obligations of good faith, diligence,
reasonableness, and care prescribed by the Code. 153 Section 2-
316(1) denies effect to disclaimers that are inconsistent with
express warranties made by sellers. 154 Section 2-719(3) provides
that a limitation on consequential damages for personal injuries
is prima facie unconscionable in the case of consumer goods. 155
Without question, though, section 2-302, which introduced the
doctrine of unconscionability, is Article 2's most important
the power of individual contracting parties in sales of goods transactions. Professor
Kamp has offered the following explanation for Code references to freedom of
contract.
A merchant's freedom to bargain is hemmed in by "reasonableness," the
standard of good faith, the use of standard terms and meanings and
nondisclaimable usage of trade.... The UCC was proposed for adoption in
the fifties, which was the worst time to mention the Code's bias against
individual bargaining. Therefore, the UCC's explicit references to freedom
of contract were added ... for political reasons.
Kamp, supra note 102, at 395 (internal citations omitted).
152 U.C.C. § 1-103(b).
153 Id. § 1-302(b).
154 Id. § 2-316(1).
155 Id. § 2-719(3).
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exception to the freedom of parties to contract upon such terms
as they might choose. 156
In the 1930s, Llewellyn explored the use of standard form
contracts in sales of goods transactions to limit warranties of
quality and remedies for breach. 157 The art of the draftsman, he
noted, is "being not only used, but abused"'158 to create lopsided
bargains which favor the drafter at the expense of the "helpless
consumer."'1 9  "A bargain, however, shows itself not to be a
bargain, when lop-sidedness begins to scream."'160 The courts'
use of "covert tools"'161 to reach just results when the art of the
draftsman has been abused must give way, he declared, to a
doctrine which enables courts to candidly evaluate the fairness
of contract content. 162  Such a doctrine, he observed, would
simply reflect what experience has shown.
156 Id. § 2-302(1). Section 208 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
(1981) also recognizes the doctrine of unconscionability. The term "unconscionable"
was suggested in 1942 by Hiram Thomas, a spokesman for the New York
Merchant's Association. Kamp, Uptown Act, supra note 120, at 306-07.
157 Llewellyn was the first scholar to explore in detail the use of standard forms
with terms which favor the drafter. Llewellyn, supra note 100, at 393-404;
Llewellyn, supra note 107, 731-34.
Llewellyn's most frequently quoted description of the relationship between
parties who do business with standard forms was made in 1960.
I know of few "private" law problems which remotely rival the
importance, economic, governmental, or "law"-legal, of the form-pad
agreement; and I know of none which has been either more disturbing to
life or more baffling to lawyers.
... It would be a heart-warming scene, a triumph of private attention to
what is essentially private self-government in the lesser transactions of life
or in those areas too specialized for the blunt, slow tools of the
legislature-if only all businessmen and all their lawyers would be
reasonable.
But power, like greed, if it does not always corrupt, goes easily to the
head. So that the form-agreements tend either at once or over the years,
and often by whole lines of trade, into a massive and almost terrifying jug-
handled character; the one party lays his head into the mouth of a lion-
either, and mostly, without reading the fine print, or occasionally in hope
and expectation (not infrequently solid) that it will be a sweet and gentle
lion.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 362 (1960).
158 Llewellyn, supra note 100, at 394.
159 Id. at 404.
160 Id. at 402.
161 Llewellyn, supra note 107, at 703.
162 "Courts' business is not the making of detailed contracts for parties; but
courts' business is eminently the making out the limits of the permissible ...." Id.
at 704.
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Folk are not, and never have been, free in our legal system to
make any agreement they please enforceable ... nor to control
the courts by stating what the parties propose to and what the
parties do not propose to excise from one of the accepted
bargain patterns .... The universal principle is ... [wihere
"agreeing" insists on getting out of hand, the court and perhaps
even the legislature will take a hand: perhaps a club. And even
where agreements are to have effect in law, they must show
sign[s] of being agreements, not dictation or overreaching. 163
Crafting a doctrine which enabled courts to draw the line
between bargains which do "outrageous work"' 64 and those which
should be enforced as made was an arduous and challenging
task. Different proposals were considered by the Article 2
Drafting Committee during the 1940s. 165 In the end, the drafters
"fudged"166 and the doctrine of unconscionability was left
undefined, a decision which shifted to others 167 the burden of
determining the circumstances in which contracts, or terms
163 Llewellyn, supra note 100, at 403 (internal citations omitted).
164 Id. at 394.
166 See Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 489-501 (1967).
166 Id. at 501.
Professor Leff noted that "the draftsmen failed fully to appreciate the
significance of the unconscionability concept's necessary procedure-substance
dichotomy and that such failure is one of the primary reasons for section 2-302's
final amorphous unintelligibility and its accompanying commentary's final
irrelevance." Id. at 488. Professor Farnsworth is more charitable. 'That the term is
incapable of precise definition is a source of both strength and weakness."
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, at 310.
However, Professor Schwartz has observed that Llewellyn did not have "the
concepts and tools of modern economic analysis. Llewellyn could not understand
how market power is acquired and exercised, and so his unconscionability theories
are too primitive." Schwartz, supra note 54, at 18.
167 Professor Leff is credited with developing the two prong test for finding
unconscionability: procedural unconscionability ("bargaining naughtiness") and
substantive unconscionability ("evils in the resulting contract"). Leff, supra note
165, at 487. The test found expression in the classic case of Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co. wherein the court declared a cross-collateral term contained
in a contract signed by a buyer to be unconscionable. "Unconscionability has
generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of
one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to
the other party." Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). Although most courts continue to insist that both procedural and
substantive unconscionability be present, a modest number of courts have found
unconscionability based on substantive unfairness alone. See, e.g., Brower v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 254, 676 N.Y.S. 2d. 569, 574 (1st Dep't 1998).
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contained therein, are lopsided and, therefore, unenforceable as
made. 168
E. Article 2 and Consumer Rights
Although Article 2 acknowledges the need for limitations
upon freedom of contract in the interests of individual
contracting parties, it continues, with only limited exceptions, 169
the common law tradition of providing rules that make no
distinction between merchant and non-merchant contracts or
between consumer and merchant contracts.1 70 Indeed, the notion
of "consumer rights" is found only in a few provisions of current
Article 2.171 The explanation lies in the fact that Article 2's
vision was created before the consumer movement was organized
and before consumer issues captured the nation's attention. The
consumer movement created a new political discourse. Its theme
was the creation and enforcement of consumer rights.
Llewellyn's vision, which had its roots in the economic and social
168 The doctrine has generally been applied by courts to protect the poor and
uneducated. See, e.g., Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 652 (N.J. 1971) ("The need
for application of the standard is most acute when the professional seller is seeking
the trade of those most subject to exploitation-the uneducated, the inexperienced
and the people of low incomes."); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 190,
298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 265 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969).
On the one hand it is necessary to recognize the importance of preserving
the integrity of agreements and the fundamental right of parties to deal,
trade, bargain, and contract. On the other hand there is concern for the
uneducated and often illiterate individual who is the victim of gross
inequality of bargaining power, usually the poorest members of the
community.
Id.; see also Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability,
63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1076-82 (1977) (expounding the view that a classification of
incompetence based on poverty is over-inclusive, thus stigmatizing the poor and
restricting freedom of contract).
169 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-502(1)(a), 2-716(3), 2-719(3) (2003); see also supra note
148 and accompanying text.
170 Professor Rubin has criticized the drafters' decision to follow the common
law tradition:
The entire framework of the UCC is based on common law. While it is
obviously a statute, and may even claim to be a code, it relies heavily upon
the common-law models. Sometimes it follows these models slavishly, and
sometimes it modifies them creatively, but common law has remained at
the foundation of the vast majority of the Code's provisions. As a result,
the Code inherits the common law's blindness to consumer concerns, the
very blindness which led directly to the law reform efforts of the consumer
movement.
Rubin, supra note 21, at 13-14.
171 See U.C.C. §§ 2-318, 2-502(1)(a), 2-716(3), 2-719(3).
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theories that existed in the 1930s, focused on the notion of
working groups empowered to establish norms to control the
behavior of their members and on the creation of a business
commonwealth. 172 Professor Allen Kamp explained:
Llewellyn's vision was different from today's "rights talk."
Whereas rights advocates view society in terms of powerless
individuals who are oppressed and exploited by powerful
institutions, Llewellyn ... and the believers in the business
commonwealth saw society as working groups engaged in
commerce. Moreover, in as much as consumer groups want to
empower consumers individually, Llewellyn wanted to
empower merchants collectively. Thus, part of the explanation
for the forgetfulness of the past is that academic trends have
changed.173
Within a decade after the Code was enacted by state
legislatures, tension between consumers and merchants
intensified. Article 2's vision was declared to be obsolete, at least
to the extent that it failed to acknowledge that the economic
welfare of all consumers was at risk and, thus, to provide
protection for fundamental consumer rights.174 The consumer
movement had emerged, its influence so powerful that opposition
to proposed reform measures "counted for virtually nothing."1 75
The role of government to secure fairness in contract
relationships between merchants and consumers was on the
verge of unprecedented growth and expansion.
172 See Kamp, supra note 102, at 382-83. "The UCC keeps the dream of the
business commonwealth, with each trade regulating its own affairs, alive." Id. at
383.
173 Id. at 392-93 (internal citations omitted).
174 See, e.g., Egon Guttman, U.C.C. D.O.A. Le Roi Est Mort, Vive Le Roi, 26
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 625, 635 (1993) (observing that "the UCC never provided a real
base for consumer protection"); Addison Mueller, Contracts of Frustration, 78 YALE
L.J. 576, 597 (1969) (stating that "the law's long-standing indifference to the
consumer's interest in sales transactions can no longer be tolerated"); Rubin, supra
note 21, at 12 ("As is generally known, the Uniform Commercial Code ... has not
been kind to consumers.").
175 Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-
Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 266 (1991).
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IV. THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT
A. Consumer Grievances and the Demand for Government
Action
The consumer movement gained momentum during the late
1960s, fueled by the willingness of politicians, the media, and
consumer groups to campaign for economic reform measures. 176
The purpose of the movement was to identify injustices suffered
by consumers in the marketplace and to lobby state legislatures
and Congress for protection laws. The consumers' plight was
bleak, especially for the nation's poor.17 7 Congressional hearings
exposed fraud and deception in consumer loans, leases, and
credit sales. Testimony from witnesses, including consumers
and representatives from legal service organizations, suggested
that the poor paid higher cash prices and higher finance charges
for goods and services than did members of the middle class who
were believed to have access to merchants offering more
favorable prices and terms.1 78 Credit transactions in poverty
areas were "marked by ignorance on the part of the buyer,
enticement, the bait of easy terms, fraudulent practices, shoddy
merchandise, unreliable dealers, garnishment, and oppressive
collection methods."1 79  Warnings that regulatory measures
would benefit some at the expense of individual choice for others
faded into the background as legislatures chose to experiment in
response to consumers' complaints about economic abuses in the
credit industry.180 In 1968, Congress enacted the Truth-in-
176 See Kripke, supra note 43, at 1-3 (noting the enthusiasm of journalists,
politicians and consumer groups for a federal truth-in-lending bill); see also Rubin,
supra note 175, at 265 (noting that the truth-in-lending bill slumbered in committee
until 1966 when "a Congress was elected with a perceived mandate to enact
consumer protection legislation").
177 See, e.g., Mary Gardiner Jones & Barry B. Boyer, Improving the Quality of
Justice in the Marketplace: The Need for Better Consumer Remedies, 40 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 357, 360-61 (1972); Kripke, supra note 43; Note, Consumer Legislation and
the Poor, 76 YALE. L.J. 745, 745-46 (1967); Symposium, Consumer Protection and
the Urban Poor, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1013 (1969); Comment, Translating
Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 395, 409-10 (1966).
178 Kripke, supra note 43, at 2-17.
179 Id. at 4.
180 See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 162 (1961) ("In most cases
the law provides benefits for one class of the population only at the cost of depriving
others of what they prefer."); Patrick Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of
Obligations, 94 L.Q. REV. 193, 218 (1978) ("To strike down, or limit the binding
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Lending Act,181 and the NCCUSL promulgated the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code 8 2 for adoption by the states. A decade of
legislative experimentation in modern consumer protection had
begun and confidence that government could protect consumers'
interests soared.
Of course, injustices did not visit the poor alone. Conditions
in most, if not all, consumer markets continued to deteriorate.
There was widespread agreement that consumers suffered not
only from disparity in bargaining power, but also from imperfect
information about the products they purchased and the terms
upon which these purchases were made.18 3 Modern consumer
force of executory contracts in order to protect some people from their own folly or
ignorance is, by contrast, a redistributive device, and like all such devices must
impose costs as well as benefits."); Jean Braucher, Contract Versus
Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV.,
697, 715 (1990) ("While one extreme tends to mean freedom for the rich, powerful,
informed, and shrewd at the expense of the poor, weak, ignorant, and naive, the
other threatens the idea of some role for individual choice.").
181 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (2000). The Act requires a creditor to disclose any
finance charge as an annual percentage rate. See id. §§ 1605(a), 1606(a). See
generally Rubin, supra note 175, at 242-63 (discussing the eight-year drafting
process). Professor Rubin observed that "efforts to determine the statute's actual
effects were largely limited to speculation." Id. at 300.
182 The UCCC was promulgated by the NCCUSL in 1968. Its principal purpose
was to provide a comprehensive and all-inclusive regulatory model to replace
existing state laws governing consumer credit sales and consumer loans. The 1968
Code was criticized for its failure to provide adequate consumer protection. See, e.g.,
J. Barry Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Critical Analysis, 44 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 53 (1969); see also Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism,
and the Uniform Law Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78
MINN. L. REV. 83, 125 (1993) (observing that the Uniform Commercial Code may be
considered the NCCUSL's "greatest success" but that the UCCC, "its most 'pro-
consumer' piece of legislation, was at least from the standpoint of state enactment,
largely a failure.").
183 Richard Barber has described the plight of the consumer as follows:
In contrast to producers (and the Government itself), who are armed with
information and who are otherwise able to make informed, rational
decisions, the individual buyer, who is besieged by advertising, deceived by
packages, confronted with an expanding range of highly complex goods,
limited in time, and exhausted by a trek along the aisles of a supermarket,
is simply not qualified to buy discriminately and wisely.
Barber, supra note 42, at 1204. See generally Frank R. Kennedy, Foreword to
Symposium on Consumer Protection, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1197-98 (1966)
(discussing the lack of information available to consumers about product quality,
availability, and prices).
Some commentators concluded that imperfect information results in contract
terms that favor the drafter, thus prompting the need for government regulation.
See, e.g., Jeffrey Davis, Revamping Consumer Credit Contract Law, 68 VA. L. REV.
1333 (1982); Rakoff, supra note 11, at 1224; see also Alan Schwartz & Louis J.
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markets were far removed from classical contract theory's vision,
which assumed equal bargaining power and perfect knowledge of
relevant market conditions. Existing legislative measures that
required disclosure of information were severely limited in scope
and coverage and, therefore, of little use to purchasers who
encountered a vast array of new products and services.18 4
Informed consumer decision-making did not occur in the
marketplace. The conclusion seemed inescapable that deviations
from the vision of equal parties caused loss to all consumers who
did not contract upon terms which favored their interests and
who did not receive the best products and services available at
the lowest possible prices. Consumers needed more
comprehensive governmental programs, which ensured the
dissemination of reliable and complete information, to enable
them to comparison shop. 185
Article 2 did not escape criticism. It did not address some
issues, such as warranty obligations from sellers to remote
buyers.18 6 Nor did the Article always capture unscrupulous
merchant behavior. Consumers complained that warranty
descriptions, which accompanied the products that they
purchased, confused and deceived them. 187 In 1975, Congress
enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,188 a statute which
relied principally upon disclosure to remedy consumers'
grievances. Many state legislatures adopted lemon laws in
response to complaints that automobile dealers failed to remedy
Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of
Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1388-89 (1983) (explaining
the view that these authors fail to appreciate different forms of imperfect
information and how, if at all, these forms affect contract content).
184 Barber, supra note 42, at 1207-17.
185 See Kennedy, supra note 183, at 1197-98 (noting agreement among the
symposium participants that government should assume a larger role in providing
the consumer "the protection to which he is entitled"). See generally Consumer
Protection Symposium, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 593 (1968).
186 See generally Donald F. Clifford, Express Warranty Liability of Remote
Sellers: One Purchase, Two Relationships, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 413 (1997); Curtis R.
Reitz, Manufacturers' Warranties of Consumer Goods, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 357 (1997).
187 See Brickey, supra note 5, at 73-77 (outlining the complaints which
prompted Congress to enact warranty protection legislation); see also Mueller, supra
note 174, at 576 (noting the presence of shoddy and defective merchandise in the
marketplace and the difficulties consumers encountered in obtaining repairs or
replacements).
188 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000); see also SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 5,
§§ 2.1.1-9.2 (providing a comprehensive treatment of the Act's provisions).
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defects in new cars.18 9 These laws made only modest inroads
upon the doctrine of freedom of contract as defined by Article 2.
By 1970, most sellers relied upon the standard form contract to
do business with consumers.1 90 Consumers were not expected to
read or to understand the terms contained in these contracts. 191
Consumers who did read these contracts did not have bargaining
power to negotiate warranty terms and remedies for breach of
these terms.1 92 Thus, sellers took advantage of the Article's
provisions, which insist that parties may choose the terms of
their bargain, to impose limited warranty obligations1 93 and
limited remedies1 94 upon unsuspecting and powerless buyers.
Lopsided bargains were believed to be the rule, not the
exception, in sales of goods transactions between merchants and
consumers.
Although the doctrine of unconscionability was only in its
infancy, some scholars concluded that it failed to provide an
effective weapon to challenge unfair terms contained in standard
forms. Critics charged that the procedural and substantive
elements of the doctrine were difficult to satisfy, except in the
most extraordinary circumstances, and that those who were able
to meet the doctrine's requirements, namely the poor and
189 The first lemon law was enacted in Connecticut in 1982. See Vogel, supra
note 5, at 590 n.3 (stating that when the Connecticut state legislature conducted
hearings on a proposed lemon law, hundreds of consumers who had purchased
defective new cars attended the hearings and testified in favor of the bill). Today, all
states and the District of Columbia have some form of this law. See SHELDON &
CARTER, supra note 5, §§ 13.1-18.9 (outlining state variations and discussing
consumer rights and remedies under these laws).
190 See Slawson, supra note 11, at 529 (stating that standard contracts
"probably account for more than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts now made").
191 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1981); see also
Eisenberg, supra note 54, at 240-43 (1995).
192 There is substantial agreement that even if consumers read and understand
disclaimers and limitation of remedies clauses, they do not have bargaining power
to change them. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 174, at 580-81; Rakoff, supra note 11,
at 1225.
193 U.C.C. § 2-316(2)-(3) (2003) (providing that the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose may be modified or disclaimed
and setting forth the requirements for effective disclaimers); see also SHELDON &
CARTER, supra note 5, §§ 2.1.1-9.2 (analyzing the relationship between section 2-
316 and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act).
194 U.C.C. § 2-719(1)-(2) (2003) (providing that the parties may by agreement
limit a buyer's remedies for breach but that if the circumstances cause an exclusive
remedy to fail of its essential purpose, Code remedies are available).
[Vol.78:663
2004] ARTICLE 2 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 701
uneducated, could not afford a lawyer. 195 Thus, as a practical
matter, most consumers had no legal tools to challenge the
enforcement of standard terms that favored the drafter unless
fraud, duress, or undue influence existed in the bargaining
process. 196
B. The Controversy Emerges
Although legislative measures designed to protect the
economic welfare of consumers multiplied in number, consumers
insisted that merchants continued to engage in unscrupulous
contract practices. Scholars began to explore in earnest the
reasons why fairness appeared not to have been achieved in
consumer goods and service transactions. The proposition,
unquestioned for decades, that inequalities enable business to
perpetrate injustices came under increasing scrutiny.197 Some
195 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness. Empathy and Economic
Analysis at the Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. REV. 349, 396 (1988) ("A
statute that gives private individuals the right to sue under a vague standard like
unconscionability or unfairness is the paradigm of ineffective consumer protection
legislation."); Leff, supra note 11, at 357 ('Wouldn't more be changed by explicit
positive law, administratively interpreted and enforced, than by the feed-back from
easily distinguishable, easily stallable, exceedingly expensive cases?").
196 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (providing that
"[w]here the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the
term is not part of the agreement"). This provision has been used in only a limited
number of jurisdictions. See James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article
2, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 315, 320-46 (1997).
It is not surprising that debate emerged over whether government is well-suited
to decide the fairness or reasonableness of contract terms. Compare Arthur A. Leff,
Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 155-56 (1970) (noting the difficulties in
determining when and how to regulate the "quality" of contract terms) with Rakoff,
supra note 11, at 1238 ("If government is at all legitimate, it is legitimate for the
purpose of framing generally applicable legal rules. That cannot be said of the form
draftsman.").
197 See Lawrence, supra note 8, at 815-17 (exploring the views that identify
different causes of consumer grievances); see also Eisenberg, supra note 54
(discussing the doctrine of unequal bargaining power and its usefulness as a guide
in determining the enforceability of contracts or terms contained therein); Duncan
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L.
REV. 563 (1982) (same). One writer noted:
[T]he laissez-faire metaphor remains central to the way the law
approaches standard form contracts. The courts continue to investigate
the actions and the agreement of the parties before them, even though the
Uniform Commercial Code admonishes the judiciary to examine the
"commercial setting, purpose, and effect" of the agreement. This judicial
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commentators, for example, attributed the sale of shoddy
merchandise and the use of terms oppressive to the lack of
competition in certain sectors of the economy. Accordingly, the
solution to the consumers' plight was to increase competition
among merchants who did business in these markets.
Merchants who did not offer higher quality products and
adequate warranty protection would inevitably lose their market
positions. 198 This view fueled doubt that existing consumer laws,
which assume that abuses are fostered by deviations from
equality, address the causes of the consumers' plight. Other
writers, however, continued to insist that injustices could be
traced to the loss of consumer bargaining power and to imperfect
information. 199
These writers also concluded that existing measures had
failed to achieve fairness in consumer transactions. A number of
reasons were offered to explain this failure. First, protection
laws were limited in scope and coverage and, therefore, did not
address many of the evils which consumers encountered in the
marketplace. 200 Second, some state legislatures had resisted
demands for reform and, thus, protection varied widely from
state to state.201  Third, legislatures had failed to provide
emphasis on the bargaining process between the immediate parties to a
contract may be misdirected. More significantly, legislative reliance on
judicial resolutions of the problems prompting such inquiries may be
unwarranted.
Kornhauser, supra note 33, at 1154.
198 See Murray, supra note 22, at 1498-99 (noting the changes in automobile
warranties to benefit consumers). Professor Murray concluded that the "total
consumer protection legislation in America has not caused this change. The cause
was something called competition-essentially competition from the Japanese. The
quality of American automobiles has improved substantially because of this
competition and not because of our legislation." Id.; see also Alan Schwartz & Louis
Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 678-79 (1979) (arguing that it is better
to increase competition than to regulate prices or prohibit the use of certain terms).
199 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 8, at 851-52 (stating that an agency
responsible for administering a mandatory disclosure system is necessary to protect
consumers).
200 See Task Force of the A.B.A., supra note 10, at 1003-04 (describing the
limitations of existing protection laws which supplement Article 2).
201 The lessons learned from the enactment process of Article 2A (Leases) have
been especially troubling. Professor Miller noted:
[Tihe Article 2A consumer provisions were not uniformly accepted in the
enactment process: some were dropped, some were changed, and some
additional ones were added. Moreover, in several states Article 2A was
stalled for a time or has not been enacted because its modest approach is
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solutions that would eradicate identified evils. Substantial
agreement existed, for example, that disclosure as mandated by
the Truth-in-Lending Act did not remedy abuses suffered by the
poor who are unable to obtain credit from merchants who offer
more favorable terms. 20 2 Finally, efforts to establish affordable
and efficient procedural mechanisms for enforcing existing rights
were in their infancy and, thus, sellers and manufacturers were
"in practical effect immune from the sanctions of the present
legal structure with respect to some claims which might be
brought against them. '20 3
Equally, if not more troubling, was the conclusion drawn by
critics that protection laws are neither necessary nor desirable.
They claimed that consumer measures rely upon the proposition
that members of the consumer class are not able to maximize
their expected utilities, a proposition unsupported by reliable
empirical evidence. 20 4 They also charged that such laws are
viewed as too modest. In some states, only when a separate consumer
leasing act was also agreed upon or enacted was Article 2A passed into
law.
Miller, supra note 14, at 194-95.
202 Several commentators have criticized the Truth-in-Lending Act. See Kripke,
supra note 43, at 2-13; Rubin, supra note 175, at 276-81.
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act has also been criticized for its failure to
provide effective warranty protection to consumers. See generally Brickey, supra
note 5. But see Robert A. Riegert, An Overview of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
and the Successful Consumer Plaintiff's Right to Attorney's Fees, 95 COM. L.J. 468,
484 (1990) (observing that the Act "substantially improves the net effect of
warranties given to consumers ... by giving consumers additional rights and
remedies without disturbing those the consumer originally had.").
Lemon laws have also been criticized. See Carol S. Nance, Virginia's Lemon
Law: The Best Treatment for Car Owner's Canker?, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 405, 423-25
(1985); Vogel, supra note 5, at 615-66. But see Julian B. Bell III, Comment, Ohio's
Lemon Law: Ohio Joins the Rest of the Nation in Waging War Against the
Automobile Limited Warranty, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1015 (1988).
203 Mary Gardiner Jones & Barry B. Boyer, Improving the Quality of Justice in
the Marketplace: The Need for Better Consumer Remedies, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
357, 361 (1972).
204 Professor Schwartz has observed:
It is now commonly assumed that many people, in particular the poor,
cannot competently maximize their utility, because these people are
ignorant, inexperienced, or simply bad at making their preferences and
purchases congruent. Even though some people are poor at maximizing
their own utility, the issue is whether the law should presume that, as a
general rule, consumers act competently. The traditional premise of
consumer competence ... should continue to govern, because the evidence
of widespread incompetence is too unreliable to justify the costs of
assuming that some consumers cannot act in their own best interests.
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undesirable because they benefit only those who obtain legal
redress for their grievances while producing adverse
consequences for others. It was feared, for example, that sellers
would pass the costs of government regulation on to the market
in the form of higher prices. Consumers would be forced to pay
these prices or do without the products. 205 It was also feared
Schwartz, supra note 168, at 1076-77 (citation omitted); see also Fred H. Miller,
Consumer Issues and the Revision of U.C.C. Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1565,
1565 n.1 (1994) (stating that most consumers are "more sophisticated and better
educated" than standard learning suggests); White, supra note 196, at 356
(observing that consumers are "smarter, more cunning, and far less honest than
their advocates make them out to be").
205 Industry opposition to special consumer measures was based upon
predictions of dire adverse consequences. In 1963, a representative of the National
Association of Manufacturers made the following statement before a U.S. Senate
subcommittee considering a truth-in-packaging bill:
The effect of this bill, if enacted, will flow into hundreds of communities
in every State, influencing the commerce and industry, the payrolls, and
the economies of those places.
The jobs of designers, artists, engineers, molders of glass and plastic,
steel and tinplate workers, machinery workers, and employees in paper
mills, printing plants, advertising agencies, and many others will be
regulated or jeopardized by this bill.
In one way or another you may expect a disruption of these enterprises,
their employees, their suppliers, their investors, and the smaller services
which surround them....
The inevitable effect of the bill will be to roll back the packaging and
marketing revolution of this generation. Had we lived in recent years
under such a law, we would not buy our products as fresh, as clean, as
unbroken or unspoiled, as accurately measured, as easily handled or as
cheaply as we do today.
Hart, supra note 105, at 1263 (quoting Hearings on Packaging and Labeling
Legislation before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 88th Cong.
(1963)).
Professor Farber has illustrated this point, using the classic case of Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445, 447-48 (D.C. Cir. 1965), in which the court
invalidated a cross-collateral provision contained in a finance agreement on the
grounds that it was unconscionable.
Under the ex ante approach ... the court's decision is troubling. The future
effect of the decision is to reduce a seller's collateral and the buyer's
incentive to scrape up the payments. Consequently, the debt becomes more
risky. To counter this increased risk, sellers will either have to raise
interest rates or refuse to lend to the riskier buyers. So the cost of taking
this particular buyer off the hook is that similar individuals in the future
will be hurt in one of two ways: They may be unable to buy furniture at all,
which seems a doubtful contribution to their well being, or they may have
to pay higher interest. At best we have forced them to exchange a package
of lower interest but strict collection practices, for another package with
higher rates but less repossession. Either way, the effect of the decision is
to harm future buyers. . . From this ex ante perspective, the court's
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that such measures would create uncertainty over the
enforceability of consumer promises, thus hampering market
efficiency by making it more difficult for merchants to plan for
the future.206 Some skeptics who adopted this line of thought
rejected the view that legislatures should engage in
experimentation. They believed that limitations upon freedom of
contract in the interests of individual contracting parties always
impose costs, even for those whom the law is intended to benefit.
In the end, legislatures must choose between competing
interests, and the choice to benefit a few at the expense of others
was a practice thought to be unwarranted and foolhardy. 207
Within the span of a decade, the issues surrounding
government regulation, and particularly consumer protection,
had become extraordinarily complex. Issues deserving of further
study had been added to those identified by Learned Hand in
1908, but answers to all of these questions remained elusive.
There was no question, however, that confidence in government
regulation eroded as claims mounted that protective laws were
ineffective and unwise. Consumer protection had become
controversial. Not unsurprisingly, neither consumer advocates
nor skeptics could prove with certainty the truth or falsity of
their respective claims. Only modest efforts were made by
scholars to gather data to establish the causes of consumer
grievances, the scope of the consumers' plight, and the effects of
existing protection laws. 208  Moreover, legislatures had not
decision is not only inefficient but perverse, because it harms the very
group it is intended to help.
Farber, supra note 134, at 57-58; see also Schwartz, supra note 168, at 1057-58
(stating that a prohibition against disclaimers "yields a nonoptimal result: some
buyers regard themselves as worse off than before the ban, and no buyers regard
themselves as better off").
206 See Lawrence, supra note 8, at 836 (noting the use of this argument by
opponents of government regulation). Critics also believed that regulation limits the
flexibility needed by certain businesses to adjust to new circumstances.
[Legislation] has a serious disadvantage. It does away with flexibility
without which only a few trades can do. It enlarges the business man's risk
and does not allow him to take measures against its increase, measures
which only he can devise and which must be applied rapidly. Legislative
compulsion works best where a trade has grown into a quasi-governmental
function, as e.g., insurance or traffic; it is almost impossible in all other
branches.
OTTO PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH
AND CONTINENTAL LAW 145 (1937).
207 See, e.g., White, supra note 196, at 355-56.
208 Some commentators have questioned whether the total results of legislation
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created mechanisms to measure the total results of their
experiments. 2 9  Thus, the wisdom of consumer measures
remained uncertain. By the early 1980s, legislatures were less
inclined to act on consumers' behalf.210 Indeed the pendulum
appeared to be swinging in favor of less intrusive control of
economic life in this country.211 Consumers, however, continued
to claim that market conditions provided evidence that bargains
as made did not maximize utilities of consumer buyers and that
legislative measures were woefully inadequate to resolve their
grievances. Indeed, judicial decisions appeared to highlight the
gap between existing legislative enactments and market
realities. 21 2  Although some issues had troubled courts for
that restricts freedom of contract can be measured at all. See Edwin W. Patterson,
Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 746 (1943).
Others doubt that comprehensive efforts to measure consequences will ever be
made. See Kennedy, supra note 197, at 603; John E. Bryson & Stephen S. Dunham,
Note, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of
Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618, 619 n.6 (1969) (noting
that the number of general discussions of problems raised by consumer credit far
exceeds the number of empirical studies undertaken). But see Rubin, supra note
175, at 235-36 (observing that a number of empirical studies to determine the
effects of the Truth-in-Lending Act were conducted after the Act was passed).
209 See Rubin, supra note 175, at 299-306 (discussing ways in which
legislatures could gather data to determine the results of protection laws).
210 By 1980, the consumer movement had lost its momentum.
Since the late 1970s, a reaction to the consumer protection movement has
been building. The rise of law and economics in the late 1970s has
presaged a political and ideological reaction to the governmental
intervention of the 1960s and early 1970s. Freedom from governmental
intervention has been the rage since the 1980s.
Woodward, supra note 7, at 245-46.
211 See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1329 (1998) (discussing the
changes that have occurred during the last twenty-five years in the regulation of
transportation, telecommunications and energy industries and suggesting that
these changes emphasize "to the maximum degree feasible, consumer choice among
multiple competing providers").
212 As legislatures became reluctant to act on consumers' behalf, consumers
turned to the courts to seek redress for their grievances.
[A]lthough the language of the current Article 2 is consumer neutral, the
case law is not. Consumer cases have played an important role in the
development of Article 2 case law involving warranties and remedies for
breach of warranties .... In the early days of the Code, the pressures
started on disclaimer issues; it was some years before failure of essential
purpose was reached. But consumers got there, and the law continues to
bear their mark.
Task Force of the A.B.A., supra note 10, at 1002; see also SHELDON & CARTER, supra
note 5, §§ 5.1-15.3 (outlining the grounds upon which consumers have claimed that
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decades, others were new. 213  It is not surprising that the
recommendation of the NCCUSL and the ALI that Article 2
should be revised appeared to re-energize consumers.
V. ARTICLE 2 AND THE UNIFORM LAW PROCESS
A. Article 2 and Consumer Protection
The Article 2 Drafting Committee began work in 1992. The
reporter, Richard E. Speidel, predicted that the Committee
would complete revisions of Article 2 in 1996.214 Two events,
however, caused lengthy delays. First, the Drafting Committee
struggled for several years to incorporate contracts involving
computer software and data into the scope of Article 2. In 1995,
the Committee concluded that a successful accommodation of
contract law and intellectual property law could not be achieved
in Article 2 and subsequently abandoned its efforts to broaden
the scope of the Article. A separate committee was formed by
the sponsoring organizations to draft Article 2B to govern
computer information transactions, but doubts regarding the
merits and enactability of Article 2B emerged. In 1999, the ALI
withdrew its sponsorship. The NCCUSL, as sole sponsor, gave
warranty disclaimers are ineffective), 9.1-11 (discussing consumer challenges to
limitation of remedy clauses).
213 One of the most troublesome issues is the enforceability of terms contained
in or on a package in which the goods are delivered. The Article 2 Drafting
Committee, appointed in 1999, declined to treat the issue. Comment 5 to the
proposed amended section 2-207 states in part:
[This] Article... takes no position on whether a court should follow the
reasoning in Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (Section
2-207 does not apply to these cases; the "rolling contract" is not made until
acceptance of the seller's terms after the goods and terms are delivered) or
the contrary reasoning in Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse
Technology, 939 F. 2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (contract is made at time of oral or
other bargain and "shrink wrap" terms or those in the container become
part of the contract only if they comply with provisions such as are
contained in Section 2-207).
U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 5 (2003).
214 Richard E. Speidel, Contract Formation and Modification Under Revised
Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1305, 1306 n.4 (1994).
Representatives of consumer organizations were not invited to be members of
the drafting committees. However, they did participate as observers. Michael M.
Greenfield, The Role of Assent in Article 2 and Article 9, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 289, 294-
95 (1997).
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the provisions of the failed Article 2B new life as the Uniform
Consumer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).215
The Article 2 Drafting Committee then turned its attention
to the question of whether additional consumer protections
should be included within Article 2. This question triggered
intense debate among all revision participants, and attempts to
reach consensus prolonged the drafting process. 216 The Study
Group appointed by the Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code had not provided a clear sense of
direction, recommending that Article 2 retain its essentially
neutral position on consumer protection, while conceding that
the matter was deserving of further study.217  Thus, the
215 Article 2B Is Withdrawn from the UCC and Will Be Promulgated by
NCCUSL as a Separate Act, A.L.I. REP. (Spring 1999), available at http://www.ali-
aba.org/ali/r2lO3-art2b.htm. On April 7, 1999, the NCCUSL and the ALI announced
that Article 2B would not be included in the Code and that the NCCUSL would
promulgate its provisions as the Uniform Consumer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA). Id. However, only Maryland and Virginia have enacted the UCITA. Scott,
supra note 23, at 1050.
Professor Scott provided a complete discussion of the controversy which
surrounds UCITA and the difficulties encountered throughout the uniform law
process in determining whether and to what extent transactions that include both
the sale of goods and the transfer of rights in information should be included within
the scope of Article 2. See Scott, supra note 23, at 1047-53.
216 See generally Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View From the
Trenches, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 607 (2001).
217 In 1990, the Permanent Editorial Board Study Group on Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code issued its Preliminary Report which identified a number
of problems with current Article 2. Comments on the Report were solicited and
received by the Study Group. The Task Force of the A.B.A. Subcommittee on
General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title was critical of
the Preliminary Report in large measure because of the Report's failure to
recommend treatment of important consumer issues within Article 2. See Task
Force of the A.B.A., supra note 10, at 1000-09.
The Study Group issued an Executive Summary as a result of comments it
received from the public. The Executive Summary recommended that Article 2 be
revised and that a drafting committee be appointed. See PEB Study Group: Uniform
Commercial Code, Article 2 Executive Summary, 46 BUS. LAW. 1869, 1876 (1991).
The Study Group also suggested that Article 2 continue its "relatively neutral
approach" on consumer protection. Id. "The reasons include the notion that Article 2
is, primarily, a commercial statute, the fact that the history of consumer protection
law reflects local, non-uniform development, and the belief that a more inclusive
approach would impair the chances for approval and ultimate adoption of any
revised Article 2." Id. However, the Study Group did concede that some new special
consumer measures might be desirable additions to Article 2 and recommended that
further study of federal and state consumer developments be undertaken. Id. at
1878. Drafts produced by the two Drafting Committees are available at
http://www.nccusl.org.
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committee was left with the difficult task of charting a course
between those who believed that fairness in contract
relationships would be achieved through a combination of
regulation and freedom of contract, and those who insisted that
the consumer class and the community would be better served by
unregulated market forces. 218
Article 2's doctrine of freedom of contract was at stake.
Consumers continued to point to the gap between contract
theory and contract practice, arguing that the addition of special,
non-variable consumer laws within Article 2 would fill the gaps
in existing legislation and ensure uniform treatment of consumer
issues in every state.219 Other revision participants concluded
that protection laws should continue to develop as a separate
body of law that supplements Article 2's provisions. This
conclusion was based, at least in part, on the concern that
skeptics would resurrect doubts about the wisdom of consumer
proposals, triggering debate between consumers and commercial
interests. Fred Miller pleaded for restraint in making revisions
until all groups could come to a consensus regarding the
appropriateness of making changes. In Miller's view, such a
218 See generally Braucher, supra note 195 (considering different versions of the
notion of "freedom of contract"); Robert Braucher, Freedom of Contract and the
Second Restatement, 78 YALE L.J. 598 (1969) (discussing the increased emphasis on
freedom of contract in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS); Harry W.
Jones, The Jurisprudence of Contracts, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 43 (1975) (examining the
conflict between freedom of contract as a policial value and the public interest in
commercial fairness and socially beneficial economic arrangements).
219 The first Drafting Committee explained its decision to include additional
special consumer provisions as follows:
Although we have not done a systematic study, it is clear that consumer
protection laws among the states vary in scope and coverage. There is no
uniformity here. Some states have little or no consumer protection
legislation while others have comprehensive legislation. Moreover, there
frequently are gaps between federal law and state law in particular areas,
such as consumer warranties. The risk is that litigation will arise in states
with weak consumer protection laws or that stronger parties will select
that law through choice of clauses. Article 2, then, is justified in providing
some consumer protection rules to fill the gaps.
Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 11, at 138 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-105 n.3 (Revision
Draft 1998)); see also James J. White, Comments at 1997 AALS Annual Meeting:
Consumer Protection and the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 219, 219
(1975) (stating that consumer advocates would argue that protection laws are
efficient "because, given the choice, consumers would pay for those consumer rights
as a form of insurance against unfair treatment upon default. Therefore[,] . .. the
law will better fit what consumers would really want if they could bargain for it.").
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consensus would ensure both approval by the sponsoring
organizations and uniform enactment by the states.220
In the early 1990s, consumers had reason to be optimistic.
Committee drafts addressed important consumer issues,
including the disclaimer of implied warranties and obligations
from sellers to remote buyers.221  Proposed section 2-206,222
220 See Miller, supra note 14, at 215 (giving reasons why all parties benefit from
uniform enactment). But see Gail Hillebrand, What's Wrong With The Uniform Law
Process, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 631 (2001) ("There's too much emphasis in the
uniform laws process on enactability at the expense of good policy.").
Some scholars concluded that nonvariable provisions designed to protect
consumers are inconsistent with Article 2's vision. Professor Scott has stated:
In a world that focuses on "rights," the normative objectives of filling gaps
with efficient defaults and regulating unbalanced bargains are
fundamentally in conflict. It is unsurprising, therefore, that a single
statutory scheme can no longer accommodate both objectives without
stimulating value conflicts that the private legislative process is ill suited
to resolve.
Scott, supra note 23, at 1054.
221 See Richard E. Speidel, Introduction to Symposium on Proposed Article 2, 54
SMU L. REV. 787, 792 n.2 (2001) ("For historical reference, the high water mark for
consumers was the November, 1996 draft prepared for the Council of the American
Law Institute."); see also Hillebrand, supra note 20, at 93-108 (discussing consumer
provisions contained in Article 2 Committee drafts through January 1997). Ms.
Hillebrand points out that the Drafting Committee did not always meet consumers'
expectations. Id. at 101-04. For example, consumer advocates had hoped that
disclaimers of implied warranties would be prohibited in consumer contracts. Id.
The Drafting Committee chose to permit disclaimers in consumer contracts and, as
a result of the need to reach consensus, diluted the standards for effective
disclaimers. Id.
In 1996, the Executive Committee of the NCCUSL recommended that a number
of special consumer provisions be included within Article 2. Examples included
provisions to enable consumers to challenge the enforceability of standard contract
terms, to require that a disclaimer of implied warranties be in a record and that a
seller carry the burden of proof that a consumer buyer expressly agreed to it, and to
provide more protection to consumers in the event a limited remedy fails of its
essential purpose. These recommendations did not include the award of attorney's
fees and costs to consumers who prevailed against sellers. See Miller, supra note 14,
at 201-02.
222 Richard Speidel explained the need for the section as follows:
Concededly, the market over time provides some balance in the content of
standard terms, and other factors, such as reputation, may induce strong
sellers to adopt buyer friendly practices. But not every seller responds or is
responsible and, if there are market failures, Article 2 as administered by
the courts is of little help.
Speidel, supra note 216, at 615.
Proposed section 2-206 was rewritten a number of times. One version, section 2-
206(b) of the January 4, 1996 (Sales) draft, stated:
A term in a standard form to which a consumer has manifested assent by
conduct or by signing the standard form is not part of the contract if the
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which created a new standard to challenge the enforceability of
terms contained in form contracts, fueled consumers' optimism.
Nevertheless, opposition to all proposals put forward by
consumers intensified. 223 Some proposals, most notably section
2-206, were rewritten a number of times in an attempt to reach
consensus among Committee members, consumers, and industry
representatives. 224 In 1999, consumer optimism faded. In May
of that year, the ALI approved the July 1999 draft. In July,
consumer could not reasonably have expected it, unless it has been
expressly agreed to by the consumer. In determining whether a term is
part of the contract, the court shall consider the content, language and
presentation of the standard form.
Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 11, at 127 n.38 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-206 (Sales Draft
1996)).
Scholars debated the merits of the proposed section. Professor Greenfield noted,
"Unconscionability is a safety valve that guards against outrageous terms; proposed
section 2-206 establishes a more appropriate standard against which to measure
whether terms in a standard form document are part of the contract." Michael M.
Greenfield, The Role ofAssent in Article 2 and Article 9, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 289, 312-
13 (1997). Professor White did not support the incorporation of the section. "Because
the provision attacks the very mechanism by which parties allocate loss (form
contracts), it is unclear how these costs of litigation and of unbargained deals-
which will be put on the backs of the honest majority of the consumer class-can be
moved elsewhere." White, supra note 196, at 356.
Professor Speidel has stated that the Drafting Committee was told by Fred
Miller in November 1996 to remove any references to standard terms and standard
forms from Committee drafts. Speidel, supra note 216, at 615. Efforts to address
standard contracts in Article 2 ended in 1999 when the second Drafting Committee
was appointed. Id.
223 See Speidel, supra note 216, at 617-18 (criticizing industry lobbying);
Speidel, supra note 221, at 792-93 (same). A number of writers have noted that
commercial interests opposed most of the proposals put forward by consumer
advocates. See, e.g., Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, On the UCC Revision Process: A
Reply to Dean Scott, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1217, 1227 n.48 (1996) (citing letters
from industry representatives, including the National Retail Federation and the
Association of National Advertisers, Inc., urging the committee to maintain the
status quo); Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 11, at 129 n.42, 132 n.46 (citing letters
from General Electric Company and the American Automobile Manufacturers
Association in opposition to a provision to deal with standard form contracts);
Hillebrand, supra note 20, at 76 n.13 (citing letters from commercial interests in
opposition to the creation of obligations from sellers to remote purchasers).
224 See Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 11 (outlining the different versions of
proposed section 2-206); Swanson, supra note 2, at 377-98 (examining committee
efforts to redraft section 2-302). Despite these efforts, substantive changes were not
made to the section or to its accompanying comments.
As proposals were rewritten, the substantive rights of consumers were usually
diluted. See Hillebrand, supra note 20, at 101-02 (noting that revisions had
weakened proposed requirements to effectively disclaim the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose).
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however, the draft was removed from the agenda for the annual
meeting of the NCCUSL. The decision of the NCCUSL
leadership to defer action for at least one year was prompted, at
least in part, by industry objections to consumer protection
provisions 225 contained in the draft, "fueling opposition to other
changes of a less controversial nature."226 The reporter for the
Committee, Richard Speidel, and the associate reporter, Linda
Rusch, resigned in protest. 227 In August, a new committee was
appointed. 228 The second Drafting Committee concluded that
revision of Article 2 was unnecessary, choosing instead to
propose amendments that were supported by "good reason" and,
therefore, not controversial. 229  Thus, efforts to incorporate
controversial, special consumer provisions into Article 2 came to
an abrupt end.230 The Committee struggled for several years to
develop amendments. The delay in completing amendments was
caused by the difficulties that the Committee encountered in
quieting opposition to Article 2's scope provision, which enabled
225 See Speidel, supra note 221, at 792 n.29 ("The pea under the mattress was a
new Section 2-206, drafted to particularize the elements of
unconscionability .... Commercial interests opposed all versions of new Section 2-
206.").
226 Id. at 792.
227 See generally Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2:
A Never Ending Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. REV. 1683 (1999)
(discussing revisions made by the first Committee and reasons why consumers
failed to achieve their objectives); Speidel, supra note 216 (same).
Professor Speidel has observed that "the arbitrary decision to pull the draft
before a final vote because of political pressure outside of the drafting process casts
a pall over the integrity of private lawmaking and taints the subsequent draft
revisions of Article 2." Speidel, supra note 221, at 793.
There is disagreement over the merits of the July 1999 Draft. Compare Roy
Ryden Anderson, Of Hidden Agendas, Naked Emperors, and a Few Good Soldiers:
The Conference's Breach of Promise... Regarding Article 2 Damage Remedies, 54
SMU L. REV. 795, 795 (2001) (describing the Draft "as a remarkable and valuable
contribution to commercial law literature and as an example of the quality of work
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was once
capable") with Patricia A. Tauchart, A Survey of Part 5 of Revised Article 2, 54 SMU
L. REV. 971, 971 (2001) (stating that "the sweeping changes of the July 1999 Draft
were not justified.").
228 See New Drafting Committee Appointed for Revised Articles 2 and 2A, A.L.I.
REP. (Fall 1999), available at http://www.ali.org/ali/R2201_Reporter.htm.
229 See Anderson, supra note 227, at 798 (discussing the decision of the second
committee not to make changes without "good reason").
230 Proposed U.C.C. §§ 2-313A and 2-313B, which both recognize obligations
from sellers to remote purchasers, did encounter opposition, but these sections
apply to all purchasers and, therefore, are not considered special consumer
provisions. See proposed U.C.C. §§ 2-313A, 2-313B.
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courts to apply Article 2 to computer information transactions.
Finally, the Committee devised a solution that retained the
current scope provision but amended the definition of "goods" to
exclude "information not associated with goods."231
The amendments approved by the NCCUSL in 2002 and by
the ALI in 2003 did not change Article 2's vision of the
marketplace or its essentially neutral position on consumer
protection. 232 Without question, proposed sections 2-313A 233 and
2-313B, 234 which recognize obligations from sellers to remote
purchasers, will benefit consumers. On the other hand, the
proposed amendments did not address standard form contracts
or attorneys' fees and costs for consumers who prevail against
sellers. Although proposed section 2-316235 strengthened the
requirements to effectively disclaim the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose in consumer
contracts, it does not meet the concern of consumers that they
did not have bargaining power to have disclaimer clauses
removed from standard forms.23 6 Thus, the decision not to
incorporate a provision which deals expressly with form
contracts, coupled with the refusal to protect consumers against
the use of clauses which disclaim implied warranties and limit
remedies for breach of these warranties, provide sufficient
evidence that freedom of contract, as defined by current Article
2, has not been redesigned. Accordingly, amended Article 2
continued to insist that, except in extraordinary circumstances,
231 U.C.C. § 2-102, which states that Article 2 "applies to transactions in goods,"
was not amended. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (2003). However, the proposed amendment to
U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(k) provides a new definition of "goods." The proposed definition
provides, in part, that the term "goods" did not include information. The term
"information" is not defined in either section or its accompanying comments. Yet,
the accompanying preliminary comment states that the Article does apply to "smart
goods" such as an automobile that contains computer programs, but that it does not
apply to an architect's provision of architectural plans on a computer disk. The
proposed comment also provides that if a transaction involved both the sale of goods
and the transfer of rights in information, the courts must determine "whether the
transaction is entirely within or outside this article, or whether or to what extent
this article should be applied to a portion of the transaction." See proposed U.C.C. §
2-103(1)(k) and preliminary comment.
232 See Maggs, supra note 25, at 602 (noting that the second committee "decided
to add provisions on electronic commerce and rewrite a few troublesome provisions,
while leaving most of the article intact").
233 See proposed U.C.C. § 2-313A.
234 See id. § 2-313B.
235 See id. § 2-316(2)-(3).
236 See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
bargains ought to be enforced as made and to assume that all
buyers have the time and financial resources to initiate private
litigation to seek redress for their grievances.
The history of the Article 2 uniform law process has been
chronicled in numerous scholarly articles. 237 Questions have
emerged over whether the approved amendments are even
necessary given recent developments in the law which provide
resolution to many of the issues identified in the early 1990s. 238
There is no doubt, however, that from the outset of the process,
consumers were placed in an unenviable position because of the
controversy which surrounds the relative merits of government
regulation and freedom of contract. Consumer protection
measures are usually experiments and Fred Miller made it clear
that experimentation within Code articles was not acceptable.
B. The Case against Experimentation
In 1995, the ALI and the NCCUSL created a subcommittee
of the Article 2 Drafting Committee to meet with consumer
representatives and commercial interests for the purpose of
determining whether consensus could be reached on issues
which had generated tension between the two groups. 239
According to Fred Miller, this action was prompted by two
concerns. First, the tension between the two groups threatened
to impede Committee progress. 240 Secondly, the question of
whether consumer measures are necessary to protect the
interests of the consumer class continued to trouble some
revision participants. Accordingly, consumer concerns "needed
better documentation to gain proper recognition and acceptance
as real problems. Thus, a period for study and reflection seemed
highly desirable."241  That Miller called for documentation to
establish need is not surprising. In 1994, he made the following
observation:
One might question whether consumers today are not more
sophisticated and better educated (or at least better able to
237 See generally Symposium, Unifying Commercial Law in the 201h Century,
Understanding the Impulse and Assessing the Effort, 62 LA. L. REV 991 (2002)
(giving the most recent, comprehensive overview of the process).
238 See generally Maggs, supra note 25 (focusing on how electronic commerce
has made Article 2 provisions and amendments to these provisions less relevant).
239 Miller, supra note 14, at 199-200.
240 Id. at 200.
241 Id.
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acquire representation) and whether business is as predatory
as the learning suggests, or whether competition significantly
lessens business' ability to impose terms against customer
interests. Of course, there always will be an underclass for
which the conventional wisdom holds true, but perhaps special
regulatory legislation should be adopted for this underclass
rather than alter the rules that work reasonably well for
others.242
In hindsight, the formation of the subcommittee served as a
warning that opposition, to at least some consumer protection
provisions, could be expected from members of the sponsoring
organizations unless evidence established that real problems
existed. Need is only one half of the equation to determine
wisdom; desirability provides the other half. In 1997, Miller
expressed concern that unproven measures could be inefficient,
producing unwanted and unintended consequences for the
consumer class and for the community as a whole. 243
Incorporation of unproven measures, he declared, was ill
advised.244 Miller's comments left no doubt that experimentation
in Code articles was to be avoided and that only proposals
supported by data that established need and efficiency would be
deemed worthy of consideration by the leadership of the
NCCUSL.
The request for research underscores the influence that the
debate of the 1970s and 1980s had in defining the issues
addressed by the uniform law process. The debate had created a
climate of skepticism, which filtered into the academic
community, lending credibility to opponents' claims that the
consumer class and the community are better served by freedom
of contract than by government regulation. The warning issued
decades earlier that government regulation in the interests of
workers might produce adverse consequences had not been
intended to discourage legislative action, but to explain why such
action is experimental. Miller resurrected this warning,
however, tailoring it to fit the context of consumer protection,
and he used it to support the conclusion that experimentation
242 Miller, supra note 204, at 1565 n.1.
243 Miller, supra note 14, at 210-11, 213, 216.
244 Id. at 213, 216
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must be replaced by a methodology which relies upon the
gathering of data.245
C. The Demand for Documentation
The challenge facing consumers was obvious. The demand
that documentation be supplied appeared non-negotiable, but
impossible to satisfy. Indeed, Miller conceded that the uniform
law process does not provide research to evaluate the expediency
of proposals considered by the various drafting committees. 246
The burden of supplying documentation, whether in the form of
empirical data or analysis of court decisions, scholarly writings
and legislative enactments, fell upon the various interests
groups. Some empirical data to establish need, such as the
number of consumers who suffer loss in any given situation or
transaction, may be impossible to collect, particularly for
markets as complex and varied as those governed by Article 2.
As Learned Hand had pointed out, the total results of legislation
are revealed only over the course of time. Although research,
which evaluates judicial decisions, scholarly opinions, and
experience under existing legislative enactments may provide
some insights into the benefits and burdens of proposed
measures, such research is time consuming and expensive to
gather. It is also inconclusive. Indeed, much of the research
would have exposed controversy, not consensus, over the causes
of injustice, the number of consumers who are unable to protect
their own best interests, and the wisdom of consumer legislation.
The perils of relying upon court decisions, for example, were
noted by the first Article 2 Drafting Committee:
A survey reveals relatively few cases under Article 2 where
former 2-302 is involved and even fewer cases finding a
contract or clause unconscionable. This could mean that there
is less unconscionability in the world than one might imagine
that strong sellers and buyers have cleaned up their acts. It
could also mean that it is difficult for consumers to litigate
these issues and that the courts are not getting a steady flow of
cases to decide. Given the relatively small size of consumer
245 See Miller, supra note 204, at 1573 n.34 (stating that commercial law, unlike
consumer law, "relies heavily upon freedom of contract and private enforcement
without sanctions and promotes the efficiency and benefit of the system as opposed
to the interests of a particular class").
246 Miller, supra note 14, at 210.
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claims and the absence of provisions in Article 2 for punitive
damages, attorney fees and class actions and the growing use of
arbitration and mediation, the latter explanation is more
probable than the former.24
7
Without question, Miller's request for research created an
obstacle for consumer advocates. 248 There were other obstacles
as well. Thus, it is impossible to determine the degree to which
each contributed to the decision of the sponsoring organizations
that Article 2 should continue to insist that, except in
extraordinary circumstances, freedom of contract maximizes
utilities and promotes the efficient allocation of resources.
Demands for data have been made in the past.249 Not everyone
agrees, however, that such demands accomplish their intended
objectives. Professor Duncan Kennedy observed:
Why is it that the patent manipulability of efficiency arguments
does not impair their attractiveness, while distributive and
paternalist arguments, which are actually easier to grasp and
to apply, seem excessively fuzzy?
At least part of the answer, I think, is that the move to
efficiency transposes a conflict between groups in a civil society
from the level of a dispute about justice and truth to a dispute
about facts-about probably unknowable social science data
that no one will ever actually try to collect but which provides
ample room for fanciful hypotheses.
Such a transposition from one level to another makes
everyone, just about, feel better about the dispute. The move
from a conflict of interests or consciousnesses to a conflict about
facts makes it seem-quite falsely-that the whole thing is less
intense and less explosive. That it is imaginable that someone
247 Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 11, at 137-38 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-105 n.3
(Sales Draft 1998)).
248 A number of writers, including some revision participants, have noted the
lack of reliable empirical evidence to establish the wisdom of proposed consumer
measures. See, e.g., Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 11 at 144; Hillebrand, supra
note 220, at 636; Hillman, supra note 22, at 1517 (stating that empirical studies
"are particularly problematic with respect to Article 2 because of the variety of
contexts and transactions it governs"); Miller, supra note 14, at 197 n.57
(acknowledging that empirical data is "remarkably hard to come by and often
inconclusive"); Rasmussen, supra note 150, at 1119 ("What benefits consumers... is
far from clear. There is no mechanism that ensures that consumer groups lobby for
positions that, in the long run, increase consumer well-being."); Speidel, supra note
215, at 609 (observing that the committee was often "shooting in the dark.").
249 See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 22, at 1517-18; Rubin, supra note 175, at 299-
306.
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could one day actually produce the factual data makes it seem
irrelevant that no one is practically engaged in that task, or
ever will be.250
It is a matter of pure speculation whether Miller's strategy
reduced the tension between consumer advocates and skeptics.
Consumers might not be so charitable. It is but a corollary that
inaction is preferable to action and that the status quo should be
maintained unless empirical research establishes that
consumers as a class are in need and that the consequences of
proposed measures are accommodating, not detrimental, to the
economic welfare of groups and the community at large. Given
that production of such data was unlikely, Miller's request
served no other purpose than to block the incorporation of
measures that had triggered controversy and threatened
uniform enactment. This charge simply begs the question and
plunges the discussion into a debate over the merits of
experimentation. The future does not look promising for
consumers who lobby Congress and state legislatures for reform
measures to supplement Article 2's provisions. They may
discover that legislators have been persuaded by skeptics,
educated by the uniform law process, to take action only when
evidence beyond the mere testimony of aggrieved witnesses is
put forward to support the wisdom of consumer laws.
CONCLUSION
The roots of the debate over the wisdom of protection laws
are found in nineteenth century classical contract theory and its
vision of the marketplace where individual and community
welfare are in perfect harmony. Market realities reveal that
contract practices deviate from the ideal, prompting scholars to
question whether these deviations create a market climate that
fosters economic abuse and whether regulatory laws achieve an
appropriate balance between contract objectives. The labor
movement provided the outline for the debate; the consumer
movement identified the details.
The conclusion that contract law has reached a crossroads is
inescapable. Consensus over which road the law should take,
though, is lacking. Unfortunately, the uniform law process
fueled the controversy over the benefits and burdens of
250 Kennedy, supra note 197, at 603.
[Vol.78:663
2004] ARTICLE 2 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 723
government regulation and, as a consequence, failed to provide a
sense of direction. Almost a century ago, Learned Hand asked
the question whether we are better off with regulation than
without it. The question is as important today as it was in 1908.
Despite the passing of time, the enactment of multiple consumer
protection laws, and the publication of scores of scholarly
writings, the question has yet to be answered.
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